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Thesis summary 
 
In 2002 Ian Manners introduced the concept of “Normative Power Europe” 
(NPE) which was an attempt to think beyond traditional conceptions of the European 
Union’s international role. Looking at the literature, the concept of NPE has often been 
used without much critical reflexion with regard to what it really means, which has left 
normative power Europe without conceptual clarity. So this thesis strives to critically 
assess Manners’ widely discussed concept, with the objective to problematize and 
further deconstruct the term “normative power”. It seeks to overcome the conceptual 
shortcomings by treating normative power as an identity attributed to European Union 
which is constructed through the practice of Othering. This thesis studies the nature of 
normative power Europe in the context of the military intervention in Libya in 2011. 
The research uses poststructuralist discourse analysis in order to study the discourse 
constructing Europe’s normative power identity against the Libyan “Other” and how 
this identity enables or constraints the Union as an actor in crisis management. It reveals 
that during the Libyan crisis there were two main discourses present within the Union 
which articulated different constructions of the Libyan conflict and the European Union 
and, therefore, called for different actions. The study of the first discourse finds that 
Europe’s normative power identity is constructed on representation of the EU as a 
“power of example”, a “carrier of universal values and norms” and a “multilateral actor” 
which promoted action from the soft side of the spectrum. The study of the critical 
discourses revealed that there was only one alternative discourse present that articulated 
different self/other constructions and called for an alternative EU action. The analysis of 
the EU’s counter-discourse resisting the calls for alternative action seeks to understand 
whether and how the Union’s normative power constructions were used to argue against 
them. The study demonstrates that the NPE is actually an identity construction practice 
within the Union’s and not a power as the EU fails to project real influence through it. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that this self-construction imposes constraints to Union’s 
foreign policy as it is used as a justification for the EU’s internal incoherence and non-
interventionism.  
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Introduction  
 
Ever since the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
scholars have struggled in conceptualizing the European Union as an international actor. 
The study of the EU’s foreign policy is complex because the Union is not a traditional 
actor in world politics but it still practices foreign policy, and has an influence in the 
international arena. But it is not only scholars who have problems in explaining the 
complex subject of EU’s foreign policy, it seems that the EU itself has difficulties in 
defining its role in world affairs and developing an effective and consistent foreign 
policy in response to conflict situations. Different theories have produced contrasting 
explanations to the EU’s actorness but there is no common agreement on what it entails. 
In 2002 Ian Manners introduced the widely debated concept of normative power Europe 
with the attempt to explain the EU’s foreign policy. However, it has become a concept 
that is used by researchers to fit the EU’s foreign policy into a certain frame, instead of 
explaining what exactly the Union’s foreign policy consists of. So this thesis seeks to 
explore the widely debated concept of normative power Europe by taking a critical 
perspective. The study treats normative power Europe as an identity construction 
practice by the European Union actors against an “Other”. 
This thesis studies the nature of normative power Europe in the context of the 
military intervention in Libya in 2011 which was the EU’s latest attempt to project to 
the world that it is a relevant actor in crisis management. The European Union was 
extensively criticised for its action, or rather inaction in Libya. The Union has worked 
on developing its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) over a decade and the 
Treaty of Lisbon aspired to make the Union a more coherent international actor. Given 
that the Libyan crisis was about democratic aspirations in the EU’s own neighbourhood 
and relatively small in scale, many saw this as an opportunity for the European Union to 
take the lead. The EU’s weak performance during the Libyan conflict not only raised 
questions about its capability as a crisis manager but also about the Union’s objectives 
and priorities in its foreign policy. 
The aim of this research is to demonstrate that the concept of normative power 
played a key role in shaping the EU foreign policy discourse in the context of Libyan 
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conflict and find out which constraints this self-construction imposed on the Union’s 
foreign policy. The research addresses the following questions:  
a. What identity does the concept of “normative power Europe” provide for the 
European Union?  
b. Does the identity of NPE enables or hinders EU actions? 
To answer these questions, the research uses the methodology of poststructuralist 
discourse analysis in order to study how Europe’s normative power identity is 
constructed through the practice of Othering and how this identity enables or constraints 
the Union to act in crisis management. The research will analyze the official and media-
level discourse within the European Union and its member countries before, during and 
in the aftermath of the military intervention in Libya. In terms of sources, for the study 
of the political-level discourse the research uses speeches, declarations, statements and 
reports on Libya issued by European institutions. For the study of the media-level 
discourse, European journals and newspaper articles are examined. The research reveals 
that two discourses were present within the European Union during the Libyan crisis. 
These discourses articulated two different constructions of the Libyan Other and the 
Europe’s Self and, thus, appealed for different actions. The study concludes that the 
Union’s NPE construction indeed played a key role shaping its foreign policy discourse 
during the Libyan conflict and also reveals two aspects in which the normative power 
Europe construction set constraints for EU’s policy response in Libya. 
In accordance with the above directions, the thesis is divided into three chapters in 
addition to introduction and conclusion. The first chapter outlines the academic debate 
on NPE, theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis, and gives an overview 
of the case. The second chapter outlines the empirical findings of the research and is 
divided into two major themes. The first part analyses the official EU discourse that 
represented Libya in terms of “oriental version of the Eastern European revolutions in 
1989” and called for actions from the soft side of the spectrum. The second part studies 
the critical discourse present within the Union which articulated Libya in terms of 
“another Yugoslavia” and called for military intervention. The final chapter outlines the 
analytical conclusions of the research. 
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Chapter I – Theoretical framework and case overview 
1.1. Background and academic debate 
 
Since the concept of normative power Europe was first introduced by Ian 
Manners in 2002, it has been actively and intensively debated by scholars in the fields 
of European Studies and International Relations. NPE is considered as one of the most 
widely used and influential ideas in the study of the European Union in the last decade.  
Normative Power Europe is not the first attempt to conceptualize the EU’s 
foreign policy – the European Union has been described also as a civilian power and a 
soft power. The former concept was introduced by François Duchêne1 and it is based on 
the idea of pursuing the domestication or “normalization” of international relations by 
tackling international problems within the sphere of contractual policies. Hedley Bull 
criticized the idea of Europe being a civilian power in his article “Civilian Power 
Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” published in 1982. Bull, the leading academic of 
the English School, claimed that civilian power concept is a contradiction in terms 
given that the only real power is the one exerted through military means
2
. He suggested 
that Europe should become more self-sufficient in security and defence, and develop its 
own military potential
3
. The concept of soft power was introduced by
 
Joseph Nye
4
 in 
2004. It marks a country’s ability to influence events through multilateral cooperation, 
institution-building, integration and the power of attraction, rather than military or 
economic coercion. Originally applied to the United States, later studies have sought to 
use the term to analyze the soft power resources of the European Union
5
.  
Manners suggested that these conceptions have become outdated as they share 
the common assumptions about the centrality of the nation-state and the notion of 
                                                            
1 Duchêne F.,(1973),  The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence, in  M. 
Kolistam and W. Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems Before The European 
Communities, London:  Macmillan 
2 Bull, H (1982), Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 21: 2, 149–170 
3 Bull, 1982: 152-156 
4 Nye, Joseph N. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success In World Politics. Public Affairs: New York 
5 See for example: Hettne, B. & Södebraum, F. (2005) Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a 
Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10: 4, 535-552 or 
Hayward, K. & Murphy, M. C. (2012) The (Soft) Power of Commitment: The EU and Conflict 
Resolution in Northern Ireland. Ethnopolitics. Vol. 11: 4, 439-452 
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national interests. In his article “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” 
published in 2002, Manners proposes that the Union should rather be seen as a 
normative actor. Manners most famous definition of normative power is “the ability to 
shape the conceptions of “normal” in international relations”6. NPE advocates the idea 
that the European Union is normatively different type of actor in world politics because 
of the combination of its historical context, hybrid policy and legal constitution
7
. 
Manners identifies nine core norms which form the EU’s normative basis – the 
centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination and sustainable development, which can be 
traced in the Union’s law or declarations8. The EU is considered a true normative actor 
if it actively promotes these principles. In a later article he suggests that the specificity 
of the EU as a normative actor is founded on the norms that are “generally 
acknowledged, within the United Nation system, to be universally applicable”9. 
Furthermore, Manners outlines six mechanisms of norm diffusion in the EU’s external 
relations, including contagion, transference, informal diffusion, procedural diffusion, 
overt diffusion and cultural filter
10
. He insists on the relative absence of force in EU’s 
imposition of norms and its aims that are linked to universal goods rather that self-
interest
11
. Manners concludes that “the most important factor shaping the international 
role of the EU is not what it does or what is says, but what it is,”12 framing the European 
Union as a power of example. Manners traced the empirical evidence on the value-
oriented policies pursued by the Union in the international arena such as the EU’s norm 
advocacy in abolishing death penalty
13
.  
Manners’ article sparked a scholarly debate on the content of the concept of 
NPE. Helene Sjursen’s criticism that normative power Europe seems to be more a 
                                                            
6 Manners, I. (2002). “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 40:2, 235-258, p 239-240 
7 Ibid. p 241 
8 Ibid. p 242 
9 Manners, I. (2008) The normative ethics of the European Union, International Affairs, Vol. 84: 1, 45–
60, p. 46 
10 Manners, 2002: 244-245 
11 Manners, I. (2006), Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads , Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 13:2, pp 182-199, pp 184 
12 Manners, 2002: 252 
13 Manners, 2002: 245-254  
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political, rather than an analytical concept
14
 has triggered a substantial research that has 
led to attempt to further define and explore the concept features. Sjursen contributes to 
the debate by questioning the theoretical validity of the normative power literature as it 
does not provide precision to empirical analysis. The underlying question that emerged 
was – how does one recognize normative power Europe when one sees it?15 Sjursen 
proposes that the solution is to study how the EU changes the structural foundation in 
world politics by strengthening the international law. Therefore, her article aims at 
establishing benchmarks for analyzing the Union’s normative power and sees the EU’s 
key impact on the cosmopolitan dimension of the international law.  
Federica Bicchi contributes to the debate by contesting the understanding that 
the EU’s norms are of universal character. Instead, she suggests that European foreign-
policy making is often Eurocentric and “based on an unreflexive attempt to promote its 
own model”16. Consequently Bicchi suggests that the standard for a normative power 
should be firstly, the inclusiveness of foreign policy-making process and secondly, 
institutional reflexivity. Inclusiveness refers to the “extent to which EU foreign policy-
makers permit a role (in theory or in practice) in EFP-making for external actors 
affected by EFP”17. Reflexivity refers to the extent to which foreign policy-makers 
usually analyse the policy it conducts in order to anticipate its effects and then adapt it 
to the expected effects on third parties. She concludes that an actor fulfils the role of a 
“normative power” if their norm promotion in an area of foreign policy is both, 
inclusive and reflexive
18
.  
Elisabeth De Zutter argues in her article “Normative power spotting: an 
ontological and methodological appraisal” that the discussion on NPE has suffered from 
conceptual vagueness and force-for-good connotations. To overcome these 
shortcomings, she privileges the ontological question of what a normative power is 
rather than what it should be and delineates the concept from requirements of certain 
                                                            
14 Sjursen, S (2006) What Kind of Power? Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13: 2, 169–81, p. 170 
15 Sjursen, S. (2006) The EU as a “normative power”: How can this be?, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 13: 2, 235-236. 
16 Bicchi, F. (2006) ‘Our size fits all’: normative power Europe and the Mediterranean, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 13:2, 286-303, p 287 
17 Ibid. p. 288 
18 Ibid. p. 298 
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types of norms or instruments. She develops a four-step methodology to “spot” a 
normative power. First, a normative power has material conditions enabling it to be a 
power in international relations. Second, the identity and role of a NPE are fulfilled if 
there is an awareness of these capabilities among the governing elites, construction of 
its own norms as universal, and willingness to project these norms in world politics. 
Lastly, a normative power’s norms have to have an impact on other political entities.19  
Tuomas Forsberg tries to clarify the conceptual confusion surrounding the NPE 
by proposing that the studies should first trace whether the EU has normative interests, 
behaves in a normative way, uses normative means of power and achieves normative 
ends. He suggests that the EU should not be automatically considered as normative 
power. Instead, the NPE should be considered as an ideal-type, since it would be hard to 
fulfil all the criteria.
20
 
As demonstrated above, there are very different interpretations on what a 
normative power is and how it should be studied. Yet there is an agreement that 
normative power is an identity of an international actor. Already Manners makes the 
claim that the EU is a normative power because it has a normative identity
21
. However, 
this is most explicitly stated by Diez who argues that “the narrative of ‘normative power 
Europe’ constructs the EU’s identity as well as the identity of the EU’s others”22. 
According to Diez, it is the construction of the “Other” as the violator of universal 
principles the EU engages in
23
. Closely related to the question of mechanisms of 
identity formation, these scholars have argued that the picture projected of the Union in 
the international arena, not only by the EU itself but also by researchers studying NPE, 
does not represent what the EU actually is but an “ideal Europe”. This means that the 
European Union is projected as a normative power even if it does not comply with its 
own norms – it suffices that it has the aspiration to promote them. They call, therefore, 
for a greater degree of reflexivity in discussing normative power and in the political 
                                                            
19 De Zutter, E. (2010) Normative power spotting: an ontological and methodological appraisal, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 17:8, 1106-1127, pp 1117 
20 Forsberg, T (2011) Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type, 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49: 6, 1183-1204 
21 Manners, 2002: 239 
22 Diez, T. (2005) Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering `Normative Power Europe', 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 33: 3,  613-639, p. 626 
23 Diez, 2005: 628 
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representation of the EU as a normative power.
 24
 Diez, for instance argues that the 
discourse of the historical Other of Europe’s past was a discourse that instilled 
reflexivity in the EU’s self-representation, but it is a discourse in decline25.  
There are several studies that have focused on the identity construction processes 
involved in the emergence of the EU normative power. For instance, Diez suggests that 
the idea of the European Union as a normative power is largely articulated in contrast to 
the US, which is constructed as conducting its foreign policy by military means rather 
than by the force of norms
26
. The study of Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli 
supports that finding. Having looked at the EU’s normative power in the 
institutionalization of the International Criminal Court and in the elaboration and 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, they found that the EU constructs its normative Self 
in opposition to the U.S. in terms of principles, goals and instruments the Union uses to 
advance its norms
 27
. Similarly, Michael Merlingen notes that by constructing itself as a 
NPE, the European Union empowers some actors and at the same time disempowers 
others
28
. 
The above overview gives an indication of how much dispute there is in the 
literature over the meaning of normative power Europe. The NPE literature is widening 
to empirical applications but it lacks critical reflection. There are still too many 
researchers focusing their discussion on to what extent the term describes the EU’s 
international behaviour. Consequently, they trace either the impact of norms in contrast 
to other possible factors or double standards in the application of norms, instead of 
analyzing the underlying nature and limits of the NPE construction. 
 
 
                                                            
24 See for example: Diez (2005) or Nicolaïdis, K. & Howse, R. (2002) ‘This is my EUtopia ...’: Narrative 
as Power, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40: 4, 767-792 
25 Diez, T. (2004) ‘Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics’. Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 319–35. 
26 Diez, T. (2004) ‘Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics’. Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 17: 2, 319–335. 
27 Scheipers, S. & Sicurelli, D. (2007) Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia? Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 45: 2, 435-457 
28 Merlingen, M. (2007) Everything Is Dangerous: A Critique of `Normative Power Europe', Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 38: 4, 435-453 
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1.2. The Study of the EU’s foreign policy though Normative Power Europe 
 
This research takes a more critical stance, departing from the existing critique 
that normative power “is not an objective category that would allow us to classify states 
and other actors” but a discourse that represents the Union as a NPE29. The foundation 
of this claim lies on the idea that all powers – military, economic, civilian – can be read 
as one specific form of normative power because they all have a normative aspect to 
them
30
. All states use normative rhetoric, behave according to normative rules and have 
interest to diffuse its norms. Instead, as argued by Thomas Diez in a frequently cited 
article, the discourse of “normative power Europe” is a practice in European identity 
construction that is based on EU’s normative difference from other countries/blocs31. 
Therefore, instead of talking about whether the concept adequately describes the EU’s 
international behaviour, I will attempt to shift the focus of the analysis away from 
discussions of normative power as a phenomenon that is already pre-given to an 
analysis of the power inherent to the representations of “normative power Europe”. Put 
simply, the study will not focus on whether the European Union is a normative power 
but aims to analyze how it is constructed as such and how this identity affects the means 
and ends of the EU’s foreign policy.  
The research departs from the argument that the narrative on “normative power 
Europe” constructs the identity of the EU as well of EU’s Others. Normative power is 
defined in terms of an identity of a power in the international system. My theoretical 
starting point is that a normative power is not “good” because it diffuses norms. Norms 
cannot be considered free by definition from interests
32
. The EU as a normative power 
has interest in diffusing its norms as it inevitably contributes to Europe’s security and to 
its advantage in the world economy
33
. Thus, the norms a normative power diffuses are 
not inherently universal but are constructed as one in order to legitimize its role as a 
norm-diffuser. Legitimacy is very important given that normative power is relational 
and actors who are exposed to normative power’s norm diffusion should see this as a 
                                                            
29 Diez, 2005:626 
30 Ibid. p. 616 
31 Ibid. p. 613-639 
32 Rees, W. (2008), Inside Out: the External Face of EU Internal Security Policy, Journal of European 
Integration, Vol. 30: 1, 97-111 or Diez, 2005: 622 
33 De Zutter, 2010: 1109 
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legitimate action. Secondly, I concur with Diez that it is not the instruments that define 
a normative power
34. Normative power does not necessarily rely on “soft” instruments 
to spread its norms but has all possible instruments, from dialogue to physical force, in 
its disposal to fulfill its role. A normative power, therefore, has a self-image as a norm-
diffuser but they do not all use the same instruments to fulfill its role. Recognizing this 
allows to separate normative power from a force of good connotation. Finally, 
normative power identity has both inclusive and exclusive features
35
. An actor which 
sets itself apart from the non-normative actors in world politics has an exclusive 
identity. However, as a normative power identity seeks to diffuse its norms, it also has 
to have inclusive identity which seeks to assimilate others.   
By using these guidelines, the study seeks to understand what impact this self-
construction of normative power has on EU’s actions during the conflict, and more 
broadly on its foreign policy and conflict resolution capacities. Does it enable it to play 
enabling role in conflict situations or is it rather restricting? I expect to find that in some 
instances, the normative power Europe discourse allows the EU to have a positive 
influence in conflict resolution but in other instances it can restrict Europe’s ability to 
impose changes on others. The restricting or permitting impacts of the NPE construction 
can be traced by examining how the Union uses its normative power identity to justify 
its actions and inactions. I believe to find an EU-level discourse which constructs the 
Union as a secure, postmodern and peaceful actor, a positive force, and a normative 
power against the world outside which is presented probably as the opposite of the 
Union’s characteristics. These constructions on Europe and its Others call for certain 
behaviour from the EU but at the same time impose constraints on the Union’s foreign 
policy. These findings would confirm that the EU is not in fact a normative power 
which imposes standards and that the NPE is just an identity of the Union.  
 
 
                                                            
34 Diez, 2005 
35 De Zutter, 2010: 1112 
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1.3. Case selection: Why Libya? 
 
Protests beginning in Benghazi on 15 February 2011 sparked a wave of anti-
government demonstrations throughout Libya. The conflict escalated as protestors took 
control of the capital and Gaddafi in response used force and violence against the 
demonstrators. The escalating conflict in Libya became a worrying concern for the 
international community.  
While some crises flare up and are forgotten rather quickly, others offer more 
permanent understanding of the global balance of power and the state of international 
relations. The Libyan crisis falls into the second category. In the European Union 
context, the strong involvement in the conflict has been perceived as an opportunity for 
the EU to assert itself as a strong global actor in its own neighbourhood. There have 
been enormous expectations of a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy after 
the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of External Action Service (EEAS). Moreover, this 
case, and the Arab Spring more widely, was the EU’s chance to promote its norms and 
universal values in its own near abroad. 
While the response of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to the 
Libyan crisis was praised for its speed, the performance of the EU was met with 
criticism. The Union’s reaction was criticized for being too slow, weak, divided and 
essentially incoherent. The actions of the European Union during the Libyan conflict 
shed light on the divisions that exist among member countries regarding common 
foreign and security policy. There was not a unanimous support for the military 
intervention in Libya within the EU – France and Britain played the leading role, along 
with Spain, Italy and Poland playing a supporting role in the action. The main dissenter 
was Germany which abstained from the UN vote authorizing the intervention.  
Up until now, there have been several researches dealing with the EU’s politics 
during the Libyan crisis. The EU’s response to the Libyan conflict has been analyzed in 
the framework of human security and “Responsibility Protect”36. This kind of research 
                                                            
36 Gottwald, M. (2012). Humanazing Security? The EU’s Responsibility to Protect in the Libyan Chrisis. 
FIIA Working Paper.   
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focuses first and foremost on the EU’s logic of security. It claims that the EU’s 
reorientation of security policy around the concept of human security was the Union’s 
primary motive for the EU’s response to the Libyan conflict. The failure to contribute to 
the military intervention is explained by the diverging interests among the member 
states
37
. Moreover, there has been a lot of discussion on the impact of internal divisions 
and lack of resources on the European Union’s foreign policy and on its activity or 
rather inactivity during the Libyan crisis
38. The Union’s weakness to respond in crisis 
situation is presented as a leadership problem within the EU, and is explained by the 
fact that the Union favours civilian and humanitarian missions to military ones and 
prefers NATO for military action. This is certainly a valid explanation for the 
ineffectiveness of the common security and foreign policy and for the failed attempt to 
develop a coherent response to the Libyan conflict. But this does not explain why the 
European Union interfered in the conflict at all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
37  Gottwald, 2012: 23 
38 See for example: Anand Menon (2011): European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya, Survival: 
Global Politics and Strategy, 53:3, 75-90 or Nicole Koenig (2011): The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In 
Quest of Coherence?, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:4, 11-30 
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1.4. Poststructuralist discourse analysis  
 
In order to deconstruct different representations of “Normative Power Europe” 
the case is analyzed in the framework of poststructuralist discourse analysis developed 
by Lene Hansen
39
. My reading of the concept of normative power Europe takes its 
inspiration from poststructuralist work on self/other constructions in international 
politics. Othering is a practice by which a political entity constructs its own identity. It 
refers to the demarcation of the Self against the outside that can be represented in terms 
of threatening, inferior, violator of universal principles or simply different
40
. 
Securitization i.e. a continued portrayal of an “Other” as threatening to one’s political 
community may result in military action
41
. My research departs from the understanding 
that identities are central in foreign policy conduct. The ontological relation between 
identity and foreign policy is explained by Hansen as follows:” Foreign policies are 
legitimized as necessary, as in the national interest, or in the defense of human rights, 
through reference to identities, yet identities are simultaneously constituted and 
reproduced through formulations of foreign policy.
42” In short, foreign policies are 
dependent upon representations, narratives and meanings given to the country, danger 
or security problem that the actor seeks to address.  Poststructuralists reject a 
relationship of causality between identity and foreign policy. Instead, both are 
understood as discursive, relational, political and social practices. They are discursive 
because objects cannot be conceived outside language; relational because an “Other” is 
always needs in order to construct the “Self”; political because there are opposing 
discourses that struggle for domination over truth; and discourses are inherently social 
because policymakers address the wider public sphere in the attempt to institutionalize 
their understanding of the truth
43
.  
In order to study the nature of European normative power identity the thesis 
analyses the discourses within the European Union and its member countries during the 
                                                            
39  Hansen, L. (2006), Security as Practice, Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, London: Routledge, 
2006. 
40 Diez, 2005: 628-629 
41 Wæver, O. (1995) Securitization and Desecuritization. In Lipschutz, R. D. (ed.), On Security (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press). 
42 Hansen, 2006:xvi 
43 Hansen, 2006: 5-6 
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Libyan conflict, starting from the beginning of the uprisings in 17
 
February 2011 until 
the end of military intervention in 31 October 2011. The research is reinforced by the 
study of media texts because they are widely read, responded to and have an effect to 
official discourse. In terms of sources, the research is based on the reading of a large 
number of texts including the policy documents, speeches and interviews conducted by 
those in power. The analysis of the popular-level discourse concentrates on the opinion 
pages and editorials of the most widely read European newspapers such as The 
Guardian, The Financial Times, The Economist, The Telegraph and Spiegel.  
First of all, I map the main discourses which are the key representations of 
identity that are constructed on radically different Others and Selves
44
. In other words, I 
analyze the European Union discourses representing the Libyan conflict. Based on these 
representations, I study how the Europe’s Self is constructed against the Libyan Other. 
Secondly, within these main discourses, I trace what EU actions were argued for in 
response to the conflict. I analyze how certain policies were justified and others 
opposed, and how these discourses sought to stabilize both, their representations of 
identity and the link between identities and policy. Followed by these guidelines, I seek 
to demonstrate firstly, the basic discourses present within the EU during the conflict that 
articulate different representation of the Libyan conflict and constructions of the EU’s 
normative power identity. By tracing the actions advocated within these basic 
discourses, I hope to show what impact Europe’s normative power identity has on the 
Union’s ability to react in crisis situations and how the self-representation of the NPE is 
used arguing for and against certain actions. 
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1.5. A timeline of key events 
 
Libyan civil war, also referred as the Libyan revolution, was an armed conflict 
between forces loyal to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and those seeking to oust his 
government. The causes of the uprisings were among others the corrupt government, 
high levels of unemployment and uneven distribution of wealth. The primary demand 
was to put an end the tyranny and authoritarian government and give power back to the 
people.  
The protests in Libya against Muammar Quadaffi started with the arrest of 
human rights activist Fethi Tabbel in 15 February. On 17
 
February, the people of Libya 
called out for “A Day of Rage” against the oppressive regime with the aid of Facebook, 
Twitter, and other Internet sites. By 23 of February, headlines of online news services 
were reporting a range of themes underlying the unstable state of the regime – the 
outbreak of a full-scale civil war
45
, the liberation of the east of the country by the 
rebels
46
, the former justice minister stated he had proof that Gaddafi gave personal order 
about Lockerbie bombing
47
, mounting international pressure and condemnation of the 
crackdown by Libyan security forces on protesters
48
 and reports that Middle Eastern 
media support the end of Gaddafi’s rule49.  
The first collective EU reaction came during a meeting of the foreign ministers 
four days after the “day of rage” in Tripoli. The communiqué condemned the repression 
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against peaceful demonstrators and deplored the violence and death of civilians
50
. 
Several similar statements by the EU were issued afterwards. Negotiations on an EU-
Libya framework agreement and ongoing cooperation contracts were suspended 
immediately.  
By mid-February, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR) Catherine Ashton activated the Monitoring and Information 
Centre (MIC) in order to facilitate the evacuation of EU citizens and maximise the use 
of transport and other logistical assets. In parallel, the European Union launched its 
humanitarian aid mission. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) 
immediately made €3 million available to tackle the immediate humanitarian needs of 
refugees fleeing Libya across the Tunisian and Egyptian borders. In addition, ECHO 
deployed teams to the Tunisian and Egyptian borders and allocated funds for water, 
shelter and food needs mainly for the migrant workers fleeing Libya.  
The gravity of the crisis was reflected in United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) vote on the 26 February which by using the language of “Responsibility to 
Protect”, demanded an immediate end to violence, imposed sanctions against Gaddafi 
and his close advisers and referred Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
calling for a war crimes investigation
51
. The breakthrough in achieving an international 
consensus was due to strong support from the Arab league and the African Union. The 
bold statements and diplomatic action that followed reflected a sense across the EU 
member states that it was less risky to act in the moment when emergency evacuations 
have sharply reduced the number of EU citizens stranded in Libya
52
. On the 28 of 
February the European Union agreed a range of sanctions against Muammar Gaddafi’s 
regime, including an arms embargo, as asset freeze and travel ban on Gaddafi and his 
close associates. Throughout the crisis, the EU adopted a range of additional sanctions 
designed to interrupt the flow of weapons and money to the regime. The sanctions were 
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51 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011). 
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a positive, yet overdue sign that the EU was catching up with the fast pace of events in 
Libya. They were intended to reflect a strong and united stance of the European Union 
against the oppressive regime but the EU’s inability to decide the imposition of 
sanctions before the UNSC Resolution haunted the Union throughout the crisis and 
caused irreversible damage to the EU’s image.  
The first calls for no-fly zone within the EU emerged already at the meeting of 
the Council of Ministers, held on the 23 of February with Sarkozy in the frontline. The 
rest of Europe remained hesitant but they did not rule out the option in case “the Libyan 
regime continued to put protests down violently”53. After the adoption of the UNSC 
resolution 1970, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Cameron aligned with Sarkozy in the 
calls for a no-fly zone over Libya but at that time they both received a lukewarm 
response from the international community and had to defend his plan after the United 
States Defence Secretary Robert Gates dismissed the idea
54
.  
Meanwhile, the EU pushed for an independent, UN-led investigation into the 
human rights abuses allegedly committed by Libyan security forces. This initiative did 
not realize until 6 of March
55
 when the foreign ministers of the 27 member states agreed 
to send a technical fact-finding mission to Libya. It was supposed to support the 
discussions in the extraordinary European Council meeting, dedicated entirely on Libya 
with “direct information”56. The fact that the leaders of the EU were meeting in 
response to the Libyan crisis was in itself important for the EU as in ten years it has 
happened only three times: for the Georgian War, the Iraq War and the 9/11 attacks. At 
the extraordinary summit taking place on the 11-12 of March, the EU sought to adopt 
“hard line” with Muammar Gaddafi by reinforcing sanctions against the Libyan regime. 
In addition, the leaders discussed measures to address the Libyan humanitarian crisis, 
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the migration issue, more specifically, responses that the EU could provide in the event 
of mass influx of migrants and refugees to its shores, and in regards of the evacuation of 
EU citizens. On the same occasion, the High Representative and the Commission 
presented a proposal for reviewing EU’s Neighbourhood Policy with the aim to set up a 
new “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” with the South 
Mediterranean
57
.  
By that time the EU was widely criticized by being “shamefully late” in its 
support for Arab rebels
58
. Moreover, the divisions within the European Union became 
more and more obvious. Before the extraordinary summit France recognized 
unilaterally the Libyan National Transit Council (NTC) as the legitimate government of 
Libya which was met with a lot of fury by other EU member states as it undermined the 
Union’s credibility as a unitary international actor59. It did less so in the European 
Parliament where MEPs adopted a resolution calling the EU as a whole to recognize 
formally Libya’s opposition as the only legitimate authority. The EU soon followed 
France and recognized the interim rebel council as a “legitimate interlocutor”. 
In an attempt to show that they were on top of the issue, Cameron and Sarkozy 
issued a joint letter on the eve of the EU extraordinary summit warning that Gaddafi 
might be guilty of crimes against humanity
60
. This was a powerful move as it would 
have given France and Britain the necessary legal cover for the imposition of a NFZ. 
However, the idea of a no-fly zone was met with a lot of scepticism and reluctance 
across the Union but the EU’s 27 member states agreed on the emergency summit that a 
no-fly zone could be imposed if three conditions were met: a demonstrable need, a clear 
legal basis and support from the region
61
. Meanwhile, France and UK continued 
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drafting a resolution authorising “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians 
under threat or attack. 
The divisions within the European Union were exposed again at the meeting of 
G8 Foreign Ministers on the 14-15 of March that was expected to recommend fresh 
measures to be included in a possible new UN Security Council resolution, as Germany 
blocked Anglo-French no-fly proposals. This set-back was even more shameful as two 
days before the Arab League called on the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over Libya
62
. 
Moreover, on the same day the Libyan revolutionary national council delegation made 
an appeal to G8 countries in Paris to launch military strikes against Gaddafi forces to 
protect rebel-held cities as rebels had carried several military setbacks
63
. After the G8 
summit not only was the European Union blamed for inaction but also the U.S. was 
criticized for indecisive leadership. 
An international consensus on the imposition of a no-fly zone was achieved on 
the 17 of March with the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution 1973 which 
opened the way for military intervention. The Resolution sanctioned the establishment 
of a non-fly zone and authorized member states “to take all necessary measures to 
protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi”64. Ten 
members of the Security Council voted in favour, with five abstaining including China, 
Russia and Germany. Germany’s decision to abstain was met with disappointment as it 
set under question the EU’s pretentions to have a common foreign policy.  
NATO was chosen to carry out the military operation in Libya, and the United 
States expected the European Union to take the lead in intervening in Libya as it was 
not interested in becoming embroiled in another Muslim country. However, the 
operation was not truly handed over to European-led NATO mission. First of all, 
although the U.S. reduced the number of its air sorties, many of the intelligence, 
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surveillance and logistics assets remain American. Secondly, only ten out of the 21 EU 
member states in NATO (plus Sweden) committed themselves in participating in the 
Unified Protector operation. But only four of them – UK, France, Belgium and 
Denmark – offered air capacities for striking targets on the ground. The leaders of the 
European Union institutions distanced themselves from the military intervention by 
only supporting it rhetorically.  
The coalition’s air strikes on Libya started two days after the adoption of the 
UNSC resolution. To general surprise, Gaddafi announced an immediate ceasefire, 
prompting relief among the rebels and Western leaders but the joy did not last long as 
the ceasefire proved to be a fiction. Gaddafi troops penetrated into Benghazi where 
street battles and artillery strikes continued through the day.  
As the humanitarian situation in the country deteriorated, the EU started 
preparations for EUFOR Libya which was supposed to be a military operation designed 
to support humanitarian assistance in the region by securing the delivery of aid supplies. 
Council approved EUFOR Libya military mission on the 1
 
of April but as the EU 
capitals could not reach agreement of full-scale Common Security and Defence (CSDP) 
operation then the launch of the mission was made conditional on the request by the 
UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The operation 
never went into effect as the United Nations considered EU’s assistance “as a last 
resort”65. As a last effort to make the EU visible, the EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton opened a European Union office in Benghazi on the 22 of May. The office 
aimed to facilitate the channelling of recourses and improve contacts with the 
opposition leaders and civil society. But more than anything it was a symbolic gesture 
of the EU being present in Libya. 
The NATO mission, Operation Unified Protector, stopped on the 31 of October 
with the death of Muammar Gaddafi, ending the Western military intervention to Libya.  
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Chapter II – The study of the European discourses on the Libyan 
conflict 
 
During the Libyan conflict two main discourses were present in the wider EU 
debate which articulated different constructions of identity and appealed to different 
European policy responses. Firstly, this chapter studies the discourse representing Libya 
as “an oriental version of the Eastern European revolutions in 1989” that constructed the 
European policy options as linked to soft instruments. Secondly, it outlines the critical 
discourse present within the Union which constructed Libya as “another Yugoslavia” 
and demanded a more bold, interventionist EU policy. 
It must be stressed again that this research is guided by the theoretical claim that 
instruments do not define a normative power, meaning that a normative power does not 
necessarily rely on soft instruments. So this research does not judge the different foreign 
policy instruments used in dealing with the crisis but tries to demonstrate that the 
actions and discourses that legitimised them were simply different, and this difference 
resulted in different identity-constructions. 
2.1. Libyan uprising as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” 
 
As reports of Libyan atrocities reached the European media, a discourse that 
represented the Libyan uprisings, its nature, participants and the role of the EU through 
the articulation of the Libyan revolution as “oriental variation of the 1989 revolutions” 
arose. It was accompanied by EU’s normative discourse about the protection of human 
rights, democracy promotion and the spread of prosperity to its immediate 
neighbourhood. 
The construction of the Libyan “Other” 
 
The discourse representing the Libyan uprisings as “oriental variation of the 
Eastern European revolutions” constructed the uprising in Libya as taking place 
between the Libyan people and the regime of Gaddafi. This discourse emphasized the 
“dictatorial” identity of Libya that was preventing the people of Libya from 
transforming and establishing a democracy. 
26 
 
The identity of the Libyans was constructed as similar to Europe while 
Gaddafi’s non-normative Otherness was emphasized through the articulations of the 
regime being “unreasonable”, “violent” and “illegitimate”. The requests of the Libyan 
people, on the contrary, were constructed as being based on the universal values of 
freedom, democracy, justice, progress and human rights – all values which represent the 
“silver thread” of the European project66 and constitute a fundamental part of the 
Europe’s self-image. Not only were the Libyans constructed as close to European Self 
because of what they stood for, but their demands were also constructed as being free of 
Islamist and anti-imperialist ideology
67
. “The uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya 
have nothing to do with fundamentalism,” argued Herman Van Rompuy, “No, the 
protesters’ aspirations are familiar to young men and women all over the world: jobs 
and justice, a say in their country's politics, the right to speak. We are not witnessing 
extremism, or a clash of civilizations, but an episode in the fight for freedom and for 
justice.”68 
The uprisings changed fundamentally the so far prevailing construction of “Arab 
exception to democracy” as this discourse articulated Libyans as being capable of 
change. “I believe that every human being from whatever culture has the same 
aspirations for freedom,” explained Barroso, “This is an historic moment and we have 
to be on the right side of history. This is a life time opportunity to assist those who are 
in the pursuit of freedom, justice, democracy and human rights.”69 Or as Ed Miliband 
argued in The Observer that “All western governments have been taught a lesson: 
democracy has been shown to be valued by ordinary people in the Arab world as much 
as it was in Eastern Europe in 1989 or in the western world before. That should give us 
all a sense of optimism about human progress and the power of people to change to 
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world.”70 This capability for transformation is crucial for the construction of the 
similarity between Europe and the Libyans
71
 which created a sense of responsibility for 
the EU in helping them to become more similar to Europe’s Self. 
Furthermore, the Libyan uprising were argued to hold a deeper source of 
legitimacy as it represented the “active will of the people” in contrast to the illegitimate 
nature of the Gaddafi regime. “The will of the people in Libya must be respected and 
the EU stands by them,
72” declared Catherine Ashton in the beginning of the crisis. The 
representation of the will of the people as a source of legitimacy is in itself notable, as 
the idea has been the one of the fundamental principle of legitimacy in Europe since 
Rousseau and it represents the direct mobilization of the people that claim universal 
rights and freedoms, in confrontation of the ruling
73
.  
The portrayal of Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” constructed 
Libya also as spatially close to the EU. The construction of Libya as Europe’s “back 
yard” created further responsibility for the EU to show that it was in front of the crisis. 
The Financial Times argues “For all that, this is a moment for Europe as important as 
any since 1989 – a test of whether the continent understands that its future cannot be 
detached from events in its near-neighbourhood.” 
The construction of Europe’s normative identity against the Libyan “Other” 
 
Next, I will look what identity this discourse on Libya provides for the European 
Union. Five distinct NPE identity constructions were spotted.  First of all, the discourse 
on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” constructed the EU’s normative 
power identity through the articulations of the European Union as the guarantor and 
carrier of liberal norms such as the rule of law, democracy, human rights, progress 
and good governance. It clearly represented the Union as above Libyans as the EU was 
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represented as the norm giver and no one really talked about a genuine Libyan 
contribution to norm creation. At the same time inclusive identity features were present 
as the discourse demonstrated EU’s openness and willingness to diffuse its norms. As 
Buzek put it “The EU's ultimate goal is to ensure that our neighbours have a future of 
liberty and prosperity in their own country. They should no longer have to flee from an 
oppressive regime. We should support them to build a free and democratic country”74. 
The Economist concurred arguing that the European Union’s role is to “always 
demonstrate that its best friends are the democrats”75. This discourse created a strong 
sense of mission for the Union to diffuse its norms in Libya and, in the words of 
Barroso, stand “side by side with those who strive for democracy, freedom and a better 
future”76. Moreover, the representation of the Libyans as requesting the same norms and 
values “that are at the heart of the European ideal”77 had a strong legitimizing function 
as it was a confirmation for the EU’s elite that its norms were appealing to the rest of 
the world.  
The Union’s determination in promoting its democratic agenda was largely due 
to the belief within the Union that its norms are universal. “Ultimately this is about 
people's deep quest for freedom, justice, dignity, social and economic opportunities, and 
democracy. These are indeed universal values. I believe that every human being from 
whatever culture has the same aspirations for freedom. Every human being, if he or she 
has the opportunity, will choose freedom. That is precisely what the young people in 
these countries are showing us,” argued Barroso78. As said before normative power’s 
norms are not universal by definition. The norms, however, that the actor seeks to 
promote constitute an important part of its identity and create a powerful incentive for 
                                                            
74 European Parliament, EP President Jerzy Buzek on Libya: "this is the point of no return", 23 February 
2011. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-
PRESS+20110223IPR14159+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN (8.04.2013) 
75 Charlemagne (2011), „Choosing new friends,“ The Economist, 7 April. Available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18527520 (15.04.2013) 
76 Barroso, J. Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Mahmoud Jibril, Chairman of 
the Executive Board of the National Transitional Council of Libya, SPEECH-11-521, Brussels, 13 July 
2011. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-521_en.htm (29.04.2013) 
77 Ashton, C. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the 
European Commission Speech on the situation in the Southern Neighbourhood and Libya, SPEECH-11-
159, Brussels, 9 March 2011. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-159_en.htm 
(29.04.2013) 
78 Barroso, M. Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Navi Pillay, United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights,“ SPEECH/11/121, Brussels, 23 February 2011. 
29 
 
action. Norms must be presented as universal in order to legitimize norm-diffusion in 
the eyes of other political entities
79
. The discourse clearly portrayed the Union’s norms 
of democracy, human rights, freedom and progress as universal that are relevant to all 
members of the human kind. Furthermore, the EU’s norms were represented as in 
accordance with the international law: “Freedom of expression and the right to 
assemble, as provided for in particular by the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, are human rights and fundamental freedoms of every human being 
which must be respected and protected.”80 These constructions of the EU’s normative 
power identity and the “universality” of its norms created further impetus for the EU to 
fulfil its norm-diffuser role. 
The discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” reveal that 
the EU’s normative power identity is constructed on its distinct nature as a political 
entity. This self-construction projects the EU as a power of example, as well as a role 
model to Others due to its own experience overcoming its historical hurdles and 
creating a democratic and prosperous political entity. “The European Union itself is a 
community of democratic Member States which have overcome tremendous historical 
hurdles. This European success story was possible when fear gave way to hope, when 
repression had to surrender to the tremendous forces of freedom,” argued Barroso, “We 
therefore totally understand where the nascent democracies in the Southern 
Mediterranean are coming from. Many people of these countries are showing that they 
don't want dictatorships. Now we need to support them in building real democracies.”81 
Barroso’s statement illustrates that the EU’s leaders expected Libya to imitate the 
Union’s normative model and example. Moreover, the EU’s self-representation that its 
norms promotion policy responds to Arab demands indicate that there is a general belief 
that the European normative model in principally “good” and exportable to different 
settings. As Ashton said in her speech to the European Parliament “It is also important 
to remember “why” we do what we do. We do this to promote and protect human rights 
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and democracy […] to help others obtain what we have. As I've many times reported a 
young man in Libya who said “we want what you have every day. You have deep 
democracy and freedom.””82  
Drawing on historical analogue, the discourse also called on the Union to follow 
in its actions the same pattern as during the Eastern European revolutions two decades 
earlier. This construction reveals a belief among EU leaders that the Union should 
project its norms through “greater political and economic openness”83. As Barroso 
argued “The events unfolding in our southern neighbourhood are a rendezvous with 
history. Europe will rise to this challenge and support the current transformation 
processes. The Commission has a crucial set of political and economic tools that we are 
already deploying and that we will strengthen further.”84 The Observer concurred “Our 
template should be the EU's response to the democratic revolutions of 1989 which 
helped make change in Eastern Europe irreversible, with economic aid, technical 
assistance and institution building.”85 The discourse constructs the European means of 
influence and instruments clearly as being from the soft side of the spectrum, claiming 
that the Union should promote its norms with political and economic openness. As The 
Economist put it “as a union, it may not have military power, but it has useful economic 
and political tools”86.  
Finally, this discourse constructs the European Union as a multilateral actor. 
Besides being a strong advocate of norms that are seen by EU leaders as stemming from 
the international law, the EU is projected as an advocate of multilateral rules and 
cooperation. First of all, the Union emphasised that in dealing with the Libyan crisis it 
had to work in line with its international partners. As Ashton put it “The crisis in Libya 
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and the events that have unfolded in North Africa and the Middle East require a 
coordinated and comprehensive international response. The EU cannot act in isolation 
and as I have always said the international community is stronger and more effective if 
it works together.”87 However, the discourse does not only construct the EU as a 
multilateral actor outside the Union but also inside. It articulates the special nature of 
the EU’s postmodern system of states. As Ashton said ahead of the Foreign Affairs 
Council „The nature of Member States is precisely that countries determine what their 
involvement should be, and countries are involved in different ways, but the EU as 27 is 
very strong.” In another statement she further argued “While contributing in a 
differentiated way, the EU and its Member States are determined to act collectively and 
resolutely, with all international partners, particularly the Arab League and other 
regional stakeholders, to give full effect to these decisions.”88 Ashton’s quotes 
demonstrate that the NPE construction involves an articulation of multilateralism which 
does not presuppose a collective action, as one would expect from the classical 
definition of the concept
89
 but instead, promotes different actions from actors in order to 
achieve a common goal. The construction of the EU as a multilateral actor was widely 
used during the Libyan crisis not only to justify the Union’s internal incoherence in 
dealing with the crisis but also its non-participation in the imposition of a no-fly zone.  
The discourse became vulnerable to dislocations as questions were raised on 
Europe’s morality in its relations with Libya in the past. “Europeans did not investigate 
Arab suffering,” argued The Guardian, “because they did not believe they had a 
democratic duty to help it end.”90 The EU’s self-construction as a normative power was 
put to test by the media that criticized the EU for failing to enter in a normative dialogue 
with its southern neighbours in the past. Moreover, Europe’s normative discourse was 
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perceived hypocritical as news about the Union’s cooperation with dictatorships in 
North Africa reached the media. “It is questionable whether the EU has been so 
concerned for democracy, freedom and human rights in these North African countries in 
recent years,” concludes The Guardian, “The EU has backed authoritarian regimes and 
dictators such as Muammar Gaddafi as a trade-off for stability in the region and for a 
better control of immigration flows across the Mediterranean”91. Or as Paul Betts put it 
in The Financial Times “Support granted for years by European leaders to corrupt and 
authoritarian regimes showed that “ethical Europe” had no clothes.”92 Therefore, the 
Union’s failure to promote its democratic agenda in the Southern Mediterranean before 
the uprisings was perceived as EU’s failure to enact its normative identity. This 
representation put the EU in a very vulnerable position, undermining its privileged 
position as a positive example of democracy. The media discourse imposed great 
pressure on the European Union to react in accordance with its core values. The failure 
of the European Union to take on the moral and political obligation evoked by the 
discourse of Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” would have implied that 
the European own identity was corrupt.  
The counter-discourse created further support among the EU leaders for action 
and led the European Union to adopt a discursive position which constructed 
responsibility for “those who demanded democracy”.  The EU’s discursive strategy for 
countering criticism was to admit the mistakes made in the past and stand on the side of 
the democratic uprising. As Štefan Füle put it “First, we must show humility about the 
past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic 
forces in the region. […] I am not saying that everything we did was wrong, rather that 
Europe, at this particular moment more than ever before, must be faithful to its values 
and stand on the side of democracy and social justice”93. The constant accentuation on 
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the EU as standing by the Libyan people and their aspirations strove to wash off the 
EU’s growing reputation as a double-dealing actor who preferred stability over values.  
2.1.1. Calls for EU action  
 
Overall, the construction of Libyan uprising as “oriental version of the Eastern 
European revolutions” was a powerful discourse which created a space where the EU 
had responsibility to help the Libyans to become similar to Europe. The representation 
of the values and that the Libyan people requested as “universal” and the Union as a 
carrier of these norms created an incentive for the EU to set up a normative agenda in its 
southern neighbourhood.  
As the claim of this thesis is that the EU’s normative power identity enables the 
European Union to take certain actions and at the same time imposes constraints in 
taking other actions, this section will trace the foreign policy instruments that the 
European Union was willing to take. It seeks to study how the outlined constructions of 
the Europe’ Self and the Libyan Other within the larger “1989” discourse were used to 
justify these actions and establish the link between EU identity and discourse.  
The central policy of the European Union from the outbreak of the Libyan civil 
war composed of three main parts. First of all, the Union committed itself in offering 
post-conflict support in the Libya’s transition to democracy. In the attempts to pursue 
and immediate policy in response to the crisis, the European Union imposed several 
sanctions against Libya. Lastly, the Union was providing humanitarian aid inside Libya 
and assisting with the evacuation of the EU citizens aimed at addressing the 
“humanitarian crisis”. The central political actors defending this policy approach were 
the European Commission together with the High Representative Catherine Ashton, 
President of the Commission José Manuel Barroso, Commissioner for Enlargement and 
European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle and President of the European Council 
Herman van Rompuy. The section reveals that the discourse on Libya as “oriental 
variation of the 1989 revolutions” was used to argue for “soft” action and a political 
solution for the crisis. 
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A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity  
 
Turning to the concrete actions that the European Union took, the discussion on 
EU’s assistance in post-conflict transformation in Libya, the so called “Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity”, held a central place within the discourse. “Europe's 
response to the Arab Spring is clear: It is a true Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity,”94 declared Barroso, reflecting the role that the European Union was most 
eager taking.  
The discourse was aiming for EU’s involvement in Libya’s post-conflict 
transition to democracy. It proposed the policy of “three Ms” – money, market access 
and mobility. The content of this was the contribution in development of the economy 
of Libya, the removal of tariff barriers, and measures to support mobility between Libya 
and the European Union. The EU also wanted to offer its technical expertise in order to 
support the democratic transformation and institution-building, a stronger partnership 
with people and civil society, and economic development in Libya. It was supposed to 
differ from previous partnerships in the region by representing it as an “incentive-based 
approach” based on the principle “more for more,” meaning that those who go faster 
and further with the reforms, could count on greater support from the Union
95
.  
From the beginning of the crisis, it was articulated that the EU’s first priority 
was to “ensure the success of the democratic transitions”96. The discourse reveals that 
the EU was determined to solve the Libyan problems by assisting it in its transition to 
democracy that permitted the Union to promote its norms of democracy, freedom, rule 
of law and development. The striking cultural differences did not discourage the 
European Union from setting up an ambitious normative agenda in Libya.  
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The strategy arguing for democratic assistance in post-conflict Libya was the 
construction of the cause of the conflict in terms of “closed and unjust nature of these 
societies”, “high levels of unemployment”, “uneven distribution of wealth” and “a lack 
of economic opportunities”97. These representations allowed the Union to express that it 
was important not to just deal with “the fall-out of the crisis” but to address “the roots of 
this process,”98 mirroring the European own experience of ensuring that war would 
become unthinkable and impossible. Catherine Ashton defended this commitment in the 
opinion pages of The New York Times “Sometimes the toughest question in world 
politics is: ‘And then what?’ […] The test for us is not just what happens in the days 
ahead, but what happens in the months and years after peace returns and the media’s 
attention has switched to crises elsewhere.
99
 
Europe justified its special role in the region on two grounds, drawing on its 
normative power constructions. First of all, the Union expressed that it was in a good 
position to help in the post-conflict transition due to its own successful experience in 
striving for peace, democracy and prosperity. Barroso argued “The European Union 
itself is a community of democratic Member States which have overcome tremendous 
historical hurdles. This European success story was possible when fear gave way to 
hope, when repression had to surrender to the tremendous forces of freedom. We 
therefore totally understand where the nascent democracies in the Southern 
Mediterranean are coming from.”100 The EU’s narrative of its historic reconciliation and 
uniqueness of its peace project reflects the Union’s self-construction as a power of 
example. The Union’s model of governance is constructed as superior to existing forms 
and the Libyans are expected to imitate the EU. However, this self-understanding 
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actually undermines the Union’s normative power as it does not allow it to share its 
experience and norms on equal grounds.  
Secondly, the Union argued that it already had a successful experience in 
supporting countries in transition from dictatorships to democracy. The echoes of the 
Eastern European revolutions of 1989 were obvious when Buzek argued “I remember 
very well after 1989, the European Union acted as a magnet for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. This played a stabilising role. This helped with the hard decisions 
of crucial and deep structural reforms. The transition would not be possible without 
such reforms. We must be the same stabilising force today, although we cannot offer the 
prospect of membership.”101 The Libyan upheaval, as William Hague and Guido 
Westerwelle argued, “Presents Europe with a challenge and an opportunity of a scale to 
match the [east European] revolutions of 1989. The EU response must match the scale 
of change and will be a key test of its credibility.”102 Thus, the EU justified its action in 
the region based on its own successful experience in the Eastern Europe of norm 
diffusion. Besides having the experience in supporting countries in transition, the 
discourse articulated also that the Union had the necessary expertise to help Libya. “We 
need to use the expertise in economic and political transformation which exists in 
Europe today. One can recall that political change and structural reform from 
dictatorship to democracy also happened in Europe,” argued Jerzy Buzek103. The self-
perception of the EU as a “stabilizing force” and a “magnet” presents the Union as a 
model of stability and prosperity which calls the Union to impose its norms and values 
to others. It implies that the EU’s model is perceived so attractive that others want to 
become similar to it. Moreover, this discourse is about giving others that are less 
developed and badly governed the chance to learn from the Europeans and adopt its 
model. The Union’s vision was to offer teaching, training and expertise, and Libya was 
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expected to socialize and learn. The EU’s discourse resembled much to that of two 
decades ago when Eastern European countries began their “return to Europe”. It was at 
that time when the EU started to develop its normative discourse in order to legitimize 
and justify the enlargement. The universal nature of EU norms was then presented as 
the reason which motivated the CEE states to take upon all the Union’s normative 
conditions voluntarily for joining it
104
. Enlargement was a very strong expression of the 
EU’s normative power as EU did not have to use any kind of persuasion but the Union’s 
model was so attractive that the new countries wanted to be part of the Union 
themselves
105
. Thus, the proposed policy of “Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity” was hoped to be a substitute of the EU’s most successful foreign policy 
tool
106
 – enlargement. 
As the EU’s approach towards Libya was clearly hierarchical, its strategy to 
create an illusion of self-determination was to emphasise the aspects of Libyan 
ownership and partnership. “Democracy cannot be imposed from outside,” said 
Buzek,
107
 referring to the Union’s changed paradigm towards its relations with Libya. 
The EU committed itself to “not dictating outcomes but supporting pluralism, 
accountability, deep democracy and shared prosperity”108. The constant articulation of 
the Libyan uprisings through the notions of “ownership”, “popular” and “home-grown” 
indicates that the European Union wanted to distance itself from neo-colonial power 
labels. There were clearly fears that if Libyans feel any sense of imposition it would 
make the former European colony suspicious of EU’s motivations and, thus, reluctant to 
European norms export through post-conflict reconstruction. As Catherine Ashton 
argued “The democratic transitions have to be home-grown. It is for the people of the 
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region to determine what lies next. But we should be ready to offer our full support, if 
asked, with creativity and determination.”109 In another statement she further elaborated 
the idea by saying “we know that in the end aid can play only a limited role. Countries 
must work and trade their way to prosperity.”110 The articulation of the new partnership 
as “Libyan led” had also a clear legitimizing effect to EU’s normative agenda. 
Although the Union’s rhetoric underlined “partnership”, “inclusivity”, 
“openness” and “shared prosperity”, the asymmetry and hierarchy in the new policy was 
still apparent in its conditionality and differentiation. Just as in 1993 with the adoption 
of Copenhagen criteria, the EU again spelled out its normative criteria for Libyans to 
gain from EU’s political and economic openness. As Catherine Ashton argued “An 
incentive-based approach is needed, with greater differentiation among countries. The 
guiding philosophy is “more for more”: those partners that go further and faster with 
reforms should be able to count on greater support from the EU.”111 Or as Nick Clegg 
out it “We must have greater conditionality in our approach and much greater political 
and economic openness towards North Africa”112. Clegg’s rhetoric on economic and 
political openness reflects also the asymmetric nature of the EU’s policies as granting 
third countries access to the highly legalised European Market requires a large degree of 
normative approximation, even harmonisation, on the part of those seeking that 
access
113
.  
The discourse on conditionality and differentiation indicates that Europe’s 
normative power identity is not as open and inclusive to “Others” which question the 
Union’s readiness to fulfil its role as a norm-diffuser. Another problem with this EU 
construction is that it lacks self-reflectivity. The Union has been applying the policies 
based on conditionality in his near-neighbourhood for decades. However, without any 
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strong positive incentives, such as the prospective of membership (carrot) or a credible 
threat (stick), the Union has to rely on others in wanting to accept its norms. 
Turning to the media discourse, it was not only the EU officials that supported 
this action, the media-level discourse also constructed the Union as suitable in helping 
Libya in its road to democracy due to its experience “having created institutions such as 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to put central and Eastern 
Europe on the path to democracy and a market economy”114. The democratisation of the 
Easter Europe was believed to be “a striking success for the “soft power” of the EU, a 
body without much of the hard sort”115. Moreover, the Libyan protests were perceived 
as an assertion that aspects of the Western model are still attractive.  
Europe’s discourse, however, was destabilized by the argument that besides 
membership prospect, the EU does not have efficient foreign policy tools and, thus, the 
Union’s action will not have same impact in Libya as in Easter Europe116. “If 
enlargement has been the EU's most successful foreign-policy tool, the attempt to 
promote reform in borderland countries with little hope of joining has largely been a 
failure,
117” wrote The Economist. Moreover, the media questioned the morality and 
effectiveness of EU actions in its Southern neighbourhood. The Financial Times argued 
“If there are grounds for scepticism, they lie in the fact that the EU has run various aid 
programmes for the region since 1995 without much impact”118. Indeed, the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy in the South was generally perceived as a failure as it was 
believed to focus only on economic deals and failed to promote political reform in these 
countries. The EU actors responded to this criticism by acknowledging the past 
mistakes and emphasising the difference of the new partnership from previous ones. As 
Cameron said: “It's a moment for Europe to say what we've done in the past hasn't 
always worked. Now we should be reaching out to these countries, offering them a new 
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partnership, opening up our markets and welcoming their approach of greater 
democracy, greater freedom, greater human rights.”119 Moreover, the Libyan revolution 
was articulated as a “historic opportunity” for the EU in order to “revive its original 
mission and to assert its ambition” in the Mediterranean area120 where the Union has 
previously failed to carry out its normative objectives. 
Sanctions  
 
The imposition of sanctions against the Libyan regime was another action 
promoted within the wider discourse of Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 
revolutions”. It drew on the normative arguments of the EU having responsibility to act 
in defence of its norms and values, and to address the suffering of the Libyan people 
who were constructed close to the EU, both spatially and in identity terms.  
The calls for sanctions within the European Union started from the very 
beginning of the conflict. The discussion reflected a worry within the Union that if it did 
not act fast in defence of its norms, the EU’s own identity would seem corrupt. William 
Hague argued that there would be a “day of reckoning” for anyone involved in 
supporting Gaddafi’s human rights abuses against protesters in Libya121. The Finnish 
Foreign Minister, Alexander Stubb, concurred: “How can we on one side look at what's 
going on in Libya, with almost 300 people shot dead, and not talk about sanctions or 
travel bans, and at the same time put travel bans and sanctions in Belarus?”122 German 
foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, argued that sanctions would be “inevitable” if the 
Libyan regime continued to put down protests so violently. “There is a great deal of 
agreement with many partners in the European Union here,” he said. “If this violence 
continues, everyone in Europe will know that this cannot go unanswered. I cannot 
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imagine that, given these terrible pictures, these terrible events in our immediate 
neighbourhood, any other policy is possible in Europe.”123 The argumentation reveals 
that there was pressure from the member states to the European Union to take 
immediate action in response to these events in order to preserve its self-image as the 
carrier and protector of norms such as human rights and democracy. 
However, it is notable that the European Union only implemented sanctions after 
the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1970 which gave the action a clear legal basis. 
Since mid-February there was constant pressure for the European Union not only from 
the member states, but also from the media to adopt sanction against Libya. Union’s 
decision to wait until the UN Security Council resolution projects the European Union’s 
NPE construction as a multilateral actor that acts in accordance with legal principles set 
by the United Nations. The EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, stated the 
measures, including an arms embargo, asset freeze and visa ban, “were aimed at 
reinforcing the UN Security Council sanctions against Libya”124. “We will work with 
the United Nations, the Arab League, the African Union and our international partners 
to respond to the crisis,” expressed the European Council after the EU extraordinary 
summit
125
. Multilateralism, thus, was used as a political and normative argument for 
EU’s commitment in imposing sanctions.  
It was after the UNSC resolution that the European Union started on insisting the 
necessity of the promotion of the values underlying the European project in its own 
neighbourhood. Europe’s discursive strategy in justifying sanctions was the 
representation of Gaddafi as “illegal” and preventing the Libyan people from achieving 
their democratic aspirations. “We have a regime turning against its own people when 
they are standing up for freedom. […] So we have to intensify our international pressure 
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on the current regime to step down,” declared Barroso126. Štefal Füle also made a 
convincing case arguing for EU’s responsibility to defend its values in Libya “I think it 
is absolutely clear to all of us that Colonel Gaddafi and the Libyan leadership have 
reached a point of no-return. The repression they have inflicted on their population had 
not been seen in Europe’s neighbourhood for at least a generation. Beyond our essential 
humanitarian and consular duties, there can be no more dealing with Libya’s 
government until he and the perpetrators of these acts are gone
127”.  
Sanctions on Gaddafi regime were also justified referring to EU’s original 
normative mission in Libya. As Lothar Bisky, member of the European Parliament 
argued “If the violence in Libya did not stop the fragile shoots of democracy in the 
region can also be destroyed if the situation in Libya gets worse”128. Overthrowing 
Gaddafi was seen as a “prerequisite to everything else” 129 as the EU could not get 
involved with the transition to democracy in Libya before Gaddafi was relinquished 
from power. It was clear from the discourse that if the conflict in Libya turned against 
the rebels, the Union’s normative ambitions of a “democratic, stable, prosperous, 
peaceful North Africa”130 would fail.  
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Humanitarian assistance 
 
The third action argued for within the wider discourse was humanitarian 
assistance but it was not a simple reproduction of the Libya as “oriental version of the 
1989 revolutions in the Eastern Europe” but modified it through the expression of 
“humanitarian responsibility” for the victims of the conflict which activated a vast 
humanitarian aid operation in Libya. The call for humanitarian assistance was 
absolutely unanimous throughout the European Union, indicating that the EU identifies 
itself with this role very strongly.  
The calls for humanitarian assistance in Libya were based not only on the 
Union’s responsibility to act in defence of its norms but it was also a securitization 
discourse trying to prevent the spill-over of the conflict. As Nick Clegg argued “There 
is no greater guarantee of the mass movement of people from north Africa into southern 
Europe than not matching the immediate humanitarian needs”131. The discussion on 
security concerns indicates that the focus on humanitarian assistance is not simply part 
of the EU’s external identity but shows that the promotion of human rights in Libya 
were also of a strategic relevance to the EU with the aim to address the roots of 
instability the crisis was causing. In response to this security concern, the EU leaders 
represented Libya in terms of a “humanitarian crisis”. The European Council’s declared 
in its statement “The humanitarian emergency in Libya and at its borders is reaching 
worrying proportions, aggravated by the massive migration movements resulting from 
the events”132. Furthermore, Kristalina Georgieva, European Commissioner for 
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, and Enikő Győri, Hungary’s Minister of State 
for EU affairs, argued in their joint statement “The unleashing of violence in Libya has 
triggered a major humanitarian crisis at Europe’s doorstep. Europe’s values and 
interests command us to act decisively and this is what we are doing.”133 Or as Cecilia 
Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs put it “I am continuously concerned 
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by the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Libya […]The European Union needs 
concerted action to facilitate the relocation and resettlement of people in need of 
international protection.”134 The reasoning on humanitarian grounds legitimized a vast 
humanitarian assistance operation in Libya. However, the discourse was not used to 
justify intervention as it was done in Bosnia and later in Kosovo
135
 as it could have 
possibly worsen the conflict and change the battlefield in favour of the Gaddafi 
government, thereby aggravating the “humanitarian crisis” the Union was trying to 
solve. 
In addition to the securitizing arguments, the discourse also articulated a 
normative concern for safeguarding human rights in Libya. For example the President 
of the European parliament, Jerzy Buzek argued that “[Europe’s] obligation is to defend 
the dignity of the people, defend the dignity of human life”136. He elaborated the idea 
further in another statement by saying “We need a strong EU presence on the ground 
providing water, food, healthcare, sanitation, tents, and camp management.  Let us build 
confidence and trust that we stand on the side of the people”137. Thus, Europe’s 
discourse on humanitarian assistance was twofold – there were certainly elements of a 
securitizing discourse but it also reflects European Union’s concern for human rights in 
Libya. The latter demonstrates that the discourse on human rights is one of the 
normative criteria for EU actions.  
However, this discourse, by constructing Libya in terms of a “humanitarian 
crisis” undermined the construction of the Libyans and Europeans as equivalent. The 
debate on immigration indicates that the discourse constituted Libyans as “foreign”. 
This was apparent from European discourse that articulated a concern of migration 
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flows resulting from Gaddafi’s repressions. Vito Bonsignore from the EPP Group 
argued that “the humanitarian crisis could result in a wave of migrants” to Europe138. 
Italy, most concerned of the 27, worried that mass exodus from Libya could be 
“Biblical” in proportions139. The articulation of Libyans in terms of a possible migration 
problem implies that the EU was not sure whether it wanted to be open to others, 
undermining the inclusive aspect of the Union’s normative identity.  
This fear did not go unnoticed by the media which repeatedly criticised the 
Union for being more concerned about migrants trying to flee to Europe than Libyans. 
The Guardian, indicating to the fact that Tunisia had been taking the biggest burden of 
migrants fleeing from Libya argued “The EU is being hypocritical at best and racist at 
worst. How can Europe say they applaud the new democracy coming to North Africa 
and then, when people flee, we turn our backs to them?”140  The term “fortress Europe” 
made definitely a comeback during the Libyan refugee crisis
141
 which furthermore 
created a dividing line between Europe and Libya. In the attempt to defend its actions, 
the Union insisted on the scale and importance of its humanitarian assistance operation 
in Libya. “The EU has stood by the Libyan people during the conflict, including 
through the delivery of significant humanitarian assistance, and will continue to do so 
now,” concluded the Council after the end of the conflict142. 
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2.2. Libya as “another Yugoslavia“  
 
The analysis of the EU’s debate calling for EU’s “soft” action reveals a 
remarkable continuity throughout the Libyan crisis. The media’s criticism is 
acknowledged and incorporated into the discourse through the articulation of EU’s 
changed attitude and the pursuit of a value-based policy towards Libya.  
The study of the alternative discourses reveals that there was actually one critical 
discourse present during the conflict challenging the discourse of the Libyan uprisings 
as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” and its policy of “soft” action. The critical 
discourse centred on the construction of the Libyan conflict as “another Yugoslavia” 
and called intensively for the imposition of a no-fly zone. These calls were advocated 
by some of the stronger member states, such as Britain and France who were backed up 
not only by the opposition from the media but also by some EU officials from the 
European Parliament 
This section studies first of all the alternative self/other constructions. Secondly, 
it analyses the calls for alternative action i.e. military intervention within this discourse. 
Lastly, as the Union managed to resist the pressure from the opposing discourse, the 
section will look at the block’s response to these calls in order to understand whether 
and in what way the EU’s NPE constructions were used as a justification for not 
participating in military action. 
 
The construction of the Libyan “Other” 
 
The study of the first discourse demonstrated that it was built on the articulation 
of Libyans as close to European Self, although inferior as they were norm-takers, and 
Gaddafi it terms of Europe’s non-normative Other. The opposing discourse on does not 
differ drastically in the construction of the Libya from the portrayal of the events in 
Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” as it in principal did agree with the 
“soft” measures the EU was advocating. However, this discourse did first and foremost 
insist on military intervention in Libya which demanded for a securitizing discourse 
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aimed at justifying this extraordinary measure
143
. The Libyan conflict was placed in the 
realm of humanitarian security through the discursive practices of political elites that 
represented Libya in terms of “humanitarian catastrophe” and a “bloodbath”, and 
stressed the need to address massive human rights violations and prevent widespread 
human suffering caused by Gaddafi’s regime. This was a powerful discourse that moved 
the issue from the realm of “strategic” within the higher grounds of the morally good. 
These constructions imposed ethical responsibility for Europe to protect the Libyan 
people.  
This discourse constructed the crisis in Libya as a space of two parties by 
separating the Libyan people and Gaddafi regime. The Libyan people were constructed 
in terms of “peaceful demonstrators” and “brave civilians” who could not take 
responsibility for their own defence and are, thus, dependent on the Other coming to 
their protection. As David Cameron argued “People, especially young people, are 
seeking their rights, and in the vast majority of cases they are doing so peacefully and 
bravely.”144 Moreover, the discourse, similarly to the “1989” discourse, represented 
Libyans as people whose identity was similar to European as they were demanding 
universal values. “The Libyan population wants the same rights and freedoms that 
people across the Middle East and North Africa are demanding, and that are enshrined 
in the values of the United Nations Charter,” argued Cameron145.  
Comparing to the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the Eastern 
European revolutions”, the critical discourse put a lot more emphasises on the radical 
Othering of Gaddafi and his regime. Gaddafi was represented as the violator of human 
rights, brutal, criminal, mad and illegal in order to mobilize international intervention in 
Libya. As Cameron put it: “Gaddafi's regime has ignored the demand of the UN 
Security Council in Resolution 1970, that it stop the violence against the Libyan people. 
His forces have attacked peaceful protesters, and are now preparing for a violent assault 
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on a city of a million people that has a history dating back 2,500 years.”146 In another 
statement he further argued “It is appalling what Qadhafi is doing in Misrata. He is 
murdering his own citizens, including children. The orders come directly from him.” 
The discourse linked the cause of the conflict directly to the persona of Gaddafi, 
presenting him as the “root of all Libyan problems” that was preventing the peaceful 
Libyans from achieving their legitimate demands. As Sarkozy and Cameron argued in a 
joint statement “The current regime has completely lost its legitimacy,” argued Sarkozy 
and Cameron in a joint statement, “Qadhafi must therefore go immediately.”147 These 
constructions imposed a responsibility for the EU to protect the Libyan people and their 
demands for universal rights from the repressive regime of Colonel Gaddafi.  
Moreover, it mobilized EU action by articulation Libya in terms of a security 
issue in Europe’s Southern border by representing Libya in terms of physically close, a 
potential migration problem, and an energy security issue. “North Africa is just 14 miles 
from Europe at its closest point, what happens to our near neighbours affects us 
deeply,” argued Nick Clegg, “at the level of human migration from North Africa to 
Europe, at the level of trade and investment between Europe and North Africa, and its 
importance to us in terms of energy, the environment and counter-terrorism”148. “Today, 
Libya is Europe’s Mexico. […] And Libya’s oil and gas help keep us warm, not 
Americans,” argued Michael White from The Guardian149. This demonstrates how 
European support for military action was also mobilized through the articulation of the 
Libyan crisis as a security issue for the EU. The Observer for example argued “Libya 
could become a new Iraq, internally divided and externally weak. Tension on the 
Tunisian and Egyptian borders will increase – creating growth in anti-western feeling in 
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Cairo – and illegal migration to Europe will explode.”150 Thus, military action in Libya 
was presented as a necessity in order to protect Europe against the external Other. 
Inaction, in the words of Sarkozy, Cameron and Obama, “would condemn Libya to 
being not only a pariah state, but a failed state too […] any deal that leaves him in 
power would lead to further chaos and lawlessness. We know from bitter experience 
what that would mean. Neither Europe, the region, or the world can afford a new safe 
haven for extremists.” 151 However, this construction of Libya as a security threat to 
Europe undermined the construction of Libyan people as close to Europe’s Self as they 
were represented as a potential migration issue for the EU. 
Alternative construction of the European Self 
 
Equally to the discourse that represented Libya in terms of “oriental version of 
the 1989 revolutions”, this discourse constructed the European Union in terms of a 
carrier of universal norms which imposed to the Union to protect and promote these 
values. As Cameron put it “While it is not for us to dictate how each country should 
meet the aspirations of its people, we must not remain silent in our belief that freedom 
and the rule of law are what best guarantee human progress and economic success. 
Freedom of expression, a free press, freedom of assembly, the right to demonstrate 
peacefully: these are basic rights.  And they are as much the rights of people in Tahrir 
Square as Trafalgar Square. They are not British or western values - but the values of 
human beings everywhere.”152 However, the fundamental difference between the two 
discourses lied in the understanding on how the EU should promote its values. While 
the EU represented itself as a power of example and insisted on promoting its norms 
through political and economic openness, the critical discourse believed that the EU 
should be capable in upholding its norms also by the use of force. To be clear, the 
discourse did not only support military action in Libya but also emphasised on the 
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importance of assisting Libya in the post-conflict transition to democracy. “Military 
action is not an objective as such. A lasting solution can only be a political one that 
belongs to the Libyan people,” argued Sarkozy and Cameron in a joint statement153. 
However, the discourse articulated first and foremost Europe’s responsibility to use 
more forceful measures in order to fulfil its role. 
EU’s unwillingness to secure its norms by using physical coercion, even when it 
had a wide international support, created a space by in which the Union was represented 
as a divided and weak military power. There was general frustration that the Union 
could not bring itself to take a unified and forceful action during the Libyan crisis. The 
echo of Yugoslavia was apparent in the argumentations which implied that due to the 
internal divisions, the EU was likely to repeat the failures in Libya as it did dealing with 
Yugoslavia in 1991 when they could not agree either on imposing a no-fly zone, nor the 
tricky area of diplomatic recognition
154
. Just as Yugoslavia was seen as a first big test to 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Libyan conflict was presented as the 
“first big test on the EU’s doorstep”155 after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty which 
created great expectations for EU’s common foreign policy. As The Economist put it 
“The crisis in North Africa looks like just the sort of problem that the institutions set up 
by the Lisbon Treaty were meant to deal with. But Catherine Ashton has been all but 
invisible.”156  
The weakness of the Union was also constructed through the radical Othering of 
the Union from the United Stated and its member states. The Union’s powerfulness was 
first of all contrasted against the “hard” power of its member states. The Telegraph 
argued “European Union is an emperor with no clothes when it comes to global power. 
[…]Yet again on a major international crisis, the EU is looking like a deer in the 
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headlights. All of the real action at the moment on Libya is taking place in the major 
capitals of Europe at a nation state level – London, Paris, Berlin.”157 The criticism 
strengthened further when Germany decided to abstain from voting on the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone together with China and Russia. A 
commentator in The Financial Times argued: “The EU cannot build a 
common foreign policy on German neutrality. […] The wider effect of all this has been 
to undermine, probably fatally, the EU’s hopes of emerging as a serious geopolitical 
actor. The bloc has its own foreign minister nowadays. It is building a fully-fledged 
diplomatic service. It is quite good at humanitarian missions. At the hard power end of 
the spectrum, however, national governments will continue to call all the shots.”158 This 
construction already creates a schizophrenic situation where the EU and its member 
states are represented in terms of two totally different actors. 
Moreover, the Union’s powerlessness was not only expressed through its radical 
Othering from its member states but also through contrasting Europe to the United 
States. The EU’s reluctance to use military power and its tendency to assert normative 
goals with soft non-coercive instruments was opposed to the America’s military might. 
The argumentation drew again parallels with the Bosnian crisis two decades ago 
claiming that the Union could not resolve a crisis without the involvement of the United 
States. “Thus are the EU’s pretensions to act as an independent global power once again 
cruelly exposed,” argued Simon Disdall from The Guardian. “Europeans live closer to 
Libya than Americans. Like Bosnia, it's on their patch. It's their problem. But without 
the US, it seems, they cannot help themselves.”159 The Guardian concurred by saying 
“US concerns about the European allies as reliable partners date back almost two 
decades, to the first years of the war in Bosnia. [...] Many Americans have concluded 
that European countries are simply unwilling to take the steps necessary to prevail in a 
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military conflict.” 160 The critical speech of the U.S. Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates 
on the EU’s declining military power at the NATO meeting in June,161 only boosted the 
discourse on Europe’s irrelevance as a global actor. It was argued that if the Union did 
not achieve the objective to protect the Libyan civilians “it will slip inevitably into 
global strategic irrelevance”162.  
The discourse indicates that the EU’s self-representation as a special post-
modern entity that does not use the traditional power instruments to diffuse its norms is 
not accepted by everyone. The above self/other constructions show clearly that there 
was an alternative representation of the Union that envisioned the EU more in terms of 
traditional nation states, such as the U.S, France and Britain and a global superpower 
that could protect its norms by intervening militarily in a global scale. 
2.2.1. Alternative action – calls for the no-fly zone 
 
Turning to the debate calling for military action, the continuity between the 
representation of Libya as “another Yugoslavia” and the promotion of the no-fly zone 
was evident in the representations of Libya in terms of “humanitarian catastrophe” and a 
“massacre”. It is noteworthy that the discourse on stopping the massive human 
sufferings in Libya that triggered the responsibility for humanitarian intervention has 
much resemblance with the discourses that surrounded the intervention on former 
Yugoslavia
163
 which mobilized the international community by articulating the situation 
in Bosnia in terms of genocide. Just as Jacques Poos, the foreign minister of 
Luxembourg, famously declared twenty years ago when Yugoslavia started to collapse 
that the “hour of Europe” has arrived164, the echoes of Yugoslavia were apparent when 
                                                            
160 Bensahel, N. (2011), „Libya: a make-or-break moment for Nato,“ The Guardian, 25 March. Available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/mar/25/nato-libya?INTCMP=SRCH 
(14.04.2013) 
161 Gates, R. (2011), „The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO),“ Brussels, 10 June 2011. 
Available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581 (27.04.2013) 
162 „Europe on the road to irrelevance,“ The Financial Times, 18 June 2011. ePaper 
163 Hansen, 2006 
164 Watt, N. (2011), „Cameron tells EU to seize moment on Libya as Yugoslavia haunts summit,“ The 
Guardian, 11 March. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/wintour-and-
watt/2011/mar/11/davidcameron-nicolas-sarkozy (7.04.2013) 
53 
 
opposition leaders called for military intervention representing the Libyan uprisings as a 
“historic test for Europe”165. 
The discourse calling for military action moved away from the articulation of the 
cause of the uprisings as due to “dire social and economic situation” and linked the 
cause of the conflict directly to the persona of Gaddafi. “We should be clear,” argued 
Cameron, “For the future of Libya and its people, Colonel Qadhafi’s regime must end 
and he must leave.”166 Furthermore, it constructed the Libyan crisis in terms of 
“humanitarian catastrophe”, a “massacre” and “exceptional” in order to mobilize 
international support for a military intervention. “Intervening in another country's affairs 
should not be undertaken save in quite exceptional circumstances,” argued David 
Cameron, “That is why we've always been clear that preparing for eventualities which 
might include the use of force - including a no fly zone or other measures to stop 
humanitarian catastrophe - would require three tests to be met. Demonstrable need. 
Regional Support. And a clear legal basis.” As Cameron’s quote indicates, the discourse 
justified military intervention on three grounds. 
Starting with the articulation of a demonstrable need, the discourse called for 
the use of force through the radical Othering of the Gaddafi regime. He was constructed 
in terms of brutal, repressive and murderous as he used military force against its own 
people. The Libyans, in contrast to Gaddafi were portrayed as “peaceful demonstrators” 
demanding their universal rights. The newspapers liked to refer to Gaddafi as “Mad 
dog”167 which was first used by Ronald Reagan, giving him a nickname with a crazed 
and irrational subtext – a rhetoric that has been used in case of foreign dictators from 
Gamal Abdel Nasser to Saddam Hussein with the aim to claim monopoly on the moral 
high ground. Moreover, Gaddafi’s regime was articulated as illegal firstly because his 
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regime had “lost the consent of his people”168 and secondly, because he “ignored the the 
demand of the UN Security Council in Resolution 1970, that it stop the violence against 
the Libyan people”169. The rhetoric on “illegitimacy” aimed at downgrading the 
Gaddafi’s regime by indicating that it has lost the “consent of the people” and legitimize 
the demands for a NFZ. Europe, therefore, had a moral duty in countering Gaddafi’s 
aggression against the protesters and “protect civilians from the murderous madness of 
a regime which is killing its own people”170.  
Prior to the extraordinary EU summit on the 11 of March, Cameron and Sarkozy 
called for military action arguing “Since the Libyan people have started to rise against 
Muammar Gaddafi's brutal regime, the world is witnessing on a daily basis an 
unacceptable continuation of violence and repression in Libya. Ignoring UN Security 
Council resolution 1970 demands as well as calls from regional organisations and the 
whole international community, Gaddafi's regime continues to attack his own people 
including with aircraft and helicopters. It is clear to us that the regime has lost any 
legitimacy it may have once had.”171 However, as the EU and the international 
community were slow to do more than just help with the humanitarian crisis and impose 
sanctions, the Franco-Britain rhetoric took a more forceful strategy for mobilizing 
European action. Drawing on the Yugoslavian analogue, Gaddafi, similarly to 
Milošević, was represented as responsible for crimes against humanity and mass human 
rights abuses against the civilian population
172
. As Sarkozy and Cameron argued “This 
deliberate use of military force against civilians is utterly unacceptable. As warned by 
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the Security Council, these acts may amount to crimes against humanity.”173 The 
vilification of the Gaddafi’s regime was accompanied by demands that insisted Gaddafi 
to “step down”174. “Qaddafi has promised to carry out terrorist attacks against civilian 
ships and airliners. And because he has lost the consent of his people any deal that 
leaves him in power would lead to further chaos and lawlessness. Colonel Gaddafi must 
go, and go for good”175 insisted Cameron, Sarkozy and Obama in a signed article.  
Basically what this discourse did was saying that if Gaddafi did not step down, 
Europe had the moral responsibility to take him down itself. As Cameron put it: “It's 
important that the countries of Europe show political will, show ambition and show 
unity in being clear that Colonel Gaddafi must go, that his regime is illegitimate and 
what he is doing to his people is completely unacceptable
176
. Furthermore, the discourse 
expressed the EU’s duty to protect its norms of democracy and human rights that were 
in “danger”. As Sarkozy put it “Arab peoples have chosen to free themselves from the 
servitude to which they have felt bound for far too long. These revolutions have given 
rise to immense hope in the hearts of all those who share the values of democracy and 
human rights. But they are not without danger. [...] In the midst of the difficulties and 
trials of all kinds that they must face, these Arab peoples need our help and support. It is 
our duty.” Cameron further argued “Any decision to put the men and women of our 
armed services into harms' way should only ever be taken when it's absolutely 
necessary. But we simply cannot stand back and let a dictator whose people have 
rejected him, kill his people indiscriminately. To do so would send a chilling signal to 
others striving for democracy across the region.”177 Therefore, the discourse on Libya as 
“another Yugoslavia” did pressure the European Union to use force against the Gaddafi 
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regime by stressing the need to uphold the universal values and showed ambition to 
diffuse these norms by all means.  
But it was not only these member states insisting on bold action, the majority of 
the members of the Parliament supported these calls by indicating that the situation in 
Libya may amount to genocide. “What do we do to avoid a second Srebrenica, Rwanda 
or a new Darfur,” asked Guy Verhofstadt from the liberal group of the European 
Parliament
178
. Sarkozy repeated the idea at a summit of European leaders on the 24 of 
March arguing that the EU had to stop the repetition of the Serebrenica massacre in 
1995
179
. The Yugoslavian analogy, thus, was not used as a caution of entrapment in a 
foreign country but instead was utilized as a precedent which should guide the EU and 
even imposed a responsibility to use of force for the protection of the civilians. “After 
Sarajevo, Kosovo and the conflicts in the Balkans, after Sierra Leone and Guinea, this 
framework allowed us to intervene over Libya,” argued Bernard Kouchner180. 
Next, the discourse on Libya as “another Yugoslavia” justified the imposition of 
a no-fly zone over Libya by stressing on the regional support and legal basis for the 
action. First of all, the arguments emphasised the support from the Libyan people and 
from the Arab League. As Cameron said “There must be a clear wish from the people of 
Libya and the wider region for international action. It was the people of Libya, through 
the Transitional National Council, who were the first to call for protection from air 
attack through a No Fly Zone. More recently, the Arab League have made the same 
demand. It really has been remarkable how Arab leaders have come forward and 
condemned the actions of Gaddafi's government.”181 In another statement he further 
added “There has been such widespread support amongst the Libyan people - and in the 
wider Arab world - for the military action we are taking. [...] As one Misurata resident 
put it: "These strikes give us hope". Today we must be clear and unequivocal: we will 
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not take that hope away.”182 Secondly, the use of force against Gaddafi’s regime was 
justified by referencing to the UNSC Resolution 1973 which gave it a clear legal basis. 
As Sarkozy and Cameron argued in a joint letter “Today, NATO and our partners are 
acting in the name of the United Nations with an unprecedented international legal 
mandate.”183 This argumentation on regional support and clear legal basis had a strong 
legitimizing effect for foreign intervention. “Following an appeal by the Arab League to 
take action to protect the people of Libya, on 17 March the United Nations Security 
Council passed an historic resolution to protect civilians from the violence unleashed by 
Qadhafi’s war machine,” argued Cameron and Sarkozy at the London Conference on 
Libya
184
. Furthermore, it was used to distance the advocators of this approach from neo-
colonial connotations. As Sarkozy put it “What makes us most proud is that among 
those who intervened were the Libyans’ Arab brothers: Qatar, the Emirates, Jordan. If 
the Arabs hadn’t had the courage to help their Libyan brothers, it would have been 
much harder for us because at no cost did we want Libya to think it detected a whiff of 
colonialism.”185 The constant emphasis on the legality and rightfulness of the 
intervention indicates that the actors calling for the use of force also constructed 
themselves in terms of a multilateral actor that follows the international legal order with 
the responsibility to “enforce international law”186. However, this discourse did not 
represent this multilateralism as a restriction in taking bold action as did the discourse 
on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” but on the contrary, used it to 
justify the use of force. 
Overall, it is clear that the opposing discourse tried to pressure the European 
Union to back up its spread of normative values by military force which demonstrates 
that there was an alternative view of the EU’s actorness. The discourse did not differ 
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very drastically in its representation of the Libyan people as they were constructed as 
close to Europe’s Self due to their request for universal values. However, in order to 
justify the use of force, the discourse did emphasize on the threatening nature of 
Gaddafi’s regime and the situation in Libya and EU’s duty to act in protection of the 
Libyan people to enforce the international law. This kind of construction imposed a lot 
of pressure for the European Union to take tough action. After the adoption of the 
support from the Arab League and the UNSC Resolution 1973, it became even harder 
for the EU to distance itself from this discourse as all the conditions agreed on at the 
extraordinary summit for a no-fly zone were met.  
2.2.2. EU’s counter-discourse 
 
The EU’s response to this pressure was very consistent throughout the crisis. 
The study of the Union’s arguments justifying the Union’s non-participation in military 
action reveals that the Union’s arguments against the imposition of a NFZ were also 
based on the discourse that articulated Libya in terms of “oriental version of the 1989 
revolutions” and on the EU’s self-understanding as a “guarantor and carrier of universal 
norms”, a “power of example” and a “multilateral actor”.  
Before the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1970 authorizing a 
no-fly zone, there were two clear arguments against military intervention. One of the 
discursive moves was the claim that it is hypocritical to use force to uphold human 
rights. “Human rights can never be imposed militarily,”187 argued the Willy Meyer, 
representative of the European Parliament. Or as Ashton put it “In a fluid situation such 
as this, our actions should be rooted in our core values and interests”188. It projects the 
EU’s normative power construction as a power of example and a carrier of universal 
norms which justifies the EU’s norm-diffusion with non-coercive means. 
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The second discursive move in opposing military action was the articulation of 
the revolution as belonging to the Libyans. “This is the revolution of the Libyan people 
and nobody can take it away from them,”189 argued Jerzy Buzek. Van Rompuy 
concurred “the outcome is of course in the hands of the people in the countries 
concerned. It will not be decided in Brussels.”190 In the midst of pressure to take more 
forceful action, the EU’s strategy was therefore to argue that the uprisings were of 
“popular” nature and had to have Libyan ownership. The Union insisted that 
intervention, instead of helping, would risk expanding conflict and strengthening 
Gaddafi by allowing him to insist that his country is again the victim of colonial 
aggression. “The military solution seems so simple but is not so simple. It's risky and 
dangerous,” Westerwelle claimed, “We are concerned about the effects on freedom 
movements in north Africa and the Arab world. We admired the jasmine revolution in 
Tunisia ... but we want these freedom movements to be strengthened, not weakened.”191 
This argumentation against the no-fly zone reflected the special European identity that 
derives its legitimacy from its guarantee of peace which does not allow it responding to 
violence with violence. Furthermore, the constant articulation of the Libyan revolutions 
as “home grown” reflects fears among EU leaders that any sense of imposition would 
make the Libyans reluctant to European norms export through and would undermine the 
Union’s self-representation as a “stabilizing force” and a “power of example”. 
When the conditions for military intervention were met, the Union rhetorically 
supported the action. After the adoption of the UN Resolution 1973 Ashton claimed that 
this “means that the conditions that were set last week by the European Council are now 
fulfilled”192. While for most of the international it signified a green light for a military 
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intervention, the European Union continued with its policies of strengthening sanctions 
and intensifying humanitarian aid. “Resolution 1973 is the backdrop against which we 
will now be looking at what more we can do in terms of economic sanctions, what more 
we can do for our planning to make sure that the EU as 27 is supportive,” 193  said 
Ashton prior to Foreign Affairs Council on the 21 March, indicating that it was not 
participating in the NATO-led military action. The EU, therefore, had to defend its non-
participation and counter the criticism of why it was not itself participating in the 
imposition of a no-fly zone. The justifications of EU leaders drew on the special 
normative identity, role and influence of Europe in the international arena and expressed 
the Union’s commitment acting in accordance with this identity.  
First of all, the EU’s discursive strategy to justify its non-participation reflected 
its normative power constructions as a power of example. “If in this first phase of our 
foreign policy we cannot be present militarily (as the EU doesn't have its own army), we 
have to exercise a humanitarian profile, defend our values and use persuasion and 
cohesion - and we are doing it,” argued Ashton194. This is a discourse that that rejects 
any involvement in the military intervention and at the same time shifts the 
responsibility of the imposition of a no-fly zone to other actors which in a way allowed 
the European Union actors to pursue its idealistic and pacifist policies.      
Secondly, the Union’s counter-discourse drew on its normative power 
construction as a multilateral actor. For instance, Ashton argued that the international 
community, along with the UN, the Arab League and a number of countries were 
coming together “willing to offer different kinds of support. […] The nature of Member 
States is precisely that countries determine what their involvement should be, and 
countries are involved in different ways, but the EU as 27 is very strong.”195 This is a 
discourse which seeks to construct the EU as supportive of the international action, yet 
simultaneously avoid any articulations which could imply to its own involvement in 
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military intervention. It reveals that the Union’s self-construction as a multilateral actor 
is a discursive practise that is used arguing that the international community consists of 
many divergent actors that take different actions in order to achieve a common goal 
which clearly justifies the Union’s idealistic role and instruments. Likewise, the same 
argumentation was used to justify the Union’s own internal decision-making process 
and role distribution. This demonstrates that multilateralism is a NPE construction that 
is used as an excuse for the EU’s internal incoherence and its non-interventionism. 
Moreover, these constructions allowed the Union to take credit for the military action, 
led by France and Britain. “Europe, both the EU as such and its Member States, is 
playing a critical political roles as well as military,” Rompuy said196. In another 
statement he furthermore declared “the Union should take credit for international action 
which prevented a “bloodbath” in Libya, amid downgrading the bloc’s common 
security policy to a food-and-blankets aid mission. […] Without Europe nothing would 
have been done at the global level or at the UN level.”197  
Another strategy to counter the criticism on EU’s non-participation in the military 
action was the construction of EU action in providing aid and reconstruction as vital and 
essential for real peace and security. As Ashton put it “We were more successful after 
1945, despite the Cold War, because we understood that we needed to do more than 
defeat Hitler. […]With Libya, success means not just protecting civilians in the days 
ahead, or even securing the end of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime. Success 
requires a strategy for what we do afterwards.”198 This quote reflects the Union’s 
engagement in constructions of the EU as a power of example and a stabilizing force by 
arguing that successful conflict resolution can happen only by addressing the 
fundamental economic, political and social needs. She furthermore argued “I readily 
concede that this agenda lacks glamour. But it does not lack ambition”199.  
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It can be concluded that the EU’s counter-arguments to the pressure imposed by the 
critical discourse reveal that Europe’s normative power construction provides a 
justification that it could not agree within the Union in taking a common stance and for 
its non-participation in the military intervention. Moreover, the discourse on the 
necessity of its actions and presenting itself as indispensable enabled the EU to some 
extent free ride on the intervention. The Union’s normative power identity, therefore, 
imposes constraints to its capability to act as it excludes any use of force or military 
action. 
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Chapter III – Analytical conclusions: the limits of NPE 
constructions 
 
This thesis has critically assessed the concept of normative power Europe by 
treating the normative power Europe as an identity construction practice within the EU. 
The research mapped the prevailing foreign policy discourses within the European 
Union during the Libyan conflict in order to understand how the EU’s normative power 
is constructed against the Libyan “Other”. Furthermore, it studied how the construction 
of EU’s normative power identity was used to justify the actions the Union did and did 
not take. In order to establish the larger discursive filed within which these official 
discourses were situated, critical discourses were studied as well. The aim of this 
research was to understand what constraints, if any, this self-construction of ENP poses 
on the Union’s foreign policy.  
The analysis demonstrates that there were two main discourses present during 
the Libyan crisis that articulated different constructions of identity and appealed to 
different European policy responses. The discourse of Libya as “oriental version of the 
Eastern European revolutions in 1989” constructed the European policy options as 
linked to the EU’s soft instruments. At the same time, the opposing discourse 
constructed Libya in terms of “another Yugoslavia” demanding a bold and 
interventionist EU policy.  
Analytical conclusions of the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions”  
 
Firstly, the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions in 
Eastern Europe” identified the use of representations which emphasized the non-
normative identity of Gaddafi that was preventing the people of Libya from 
transforming and establishing a democracy. The discourse constructed the Union’s 
normative power identity on the representations of the Union as a carrier and promoter 
of universal norms, an example-settler and a multilateral actor, which created strong 
normative arguments for the EU’s norm-diffusion in Libya. These self/other 
constructions were used to legitimize three actions from the soft power side of the 
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spectrum – assistance in post-conflict transition to democracy, sanctions and 
humanitarian assistance.  
The analysis shows that the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 
revolutions” was used to argue for EU’s assistance in post-conflict Libya. Europe 
justified its role on two grounds. Firstly, it expressed its own successful experience in 
striving for peace, democracy and prosperity and secondly, its success in supporting 
countries in transition from dictatorships to democracy. The use of Eastern European 
analogy in constructing the Libyan crisis and Europe’s role was especially important as 
it was used to argue for the same action from the EU which was the successful in the 
CEE countries. The analysis of the discourse revealed that there was a widespread 
understanding within the EU that its model is perceived so attractive that others want to 
become similar to it, which justified the Union’s policy of Partnership for Democracy 
and Shared Prosperity. 
Next, the “1989” discourse also argued for sanctions and humanitarian 
assistance in Libya. The analysis showed that the imposition of sanctions was not the 
EU’s first choice of action. However, the EU took a hard line with Libya after the 
UNSC decision to authorize sanctions, which reflected the Union’s self-construction as 
an advocate of multilateral rules and cooperation. The discourse calling for 
humanitarian assistance was first and foremost a securitizing discourse as it constructed 
Libya in terms of “humanitarian crisis” and as a potential immigration issue. However, 
it also articulated a great concern for the grave human rights situation in Libya which 
shows that human rights is one of the normative criteria for its actions. 
The analysis of the discourse representing Libya in terms of “oriental version of 
the 1989 revolution” demonstrates that the Union’s approach to the Libyan conflict was 
very similar to the one directed towards post-communist states in Eastern Europe. This 
indicates that the Union tends to follow the same pattern in its foreign policy. The EU’s 
self-understanding of its role in crisis management is characterized by an aspiration to 
be a role model and an example setter. The European Union perceives its norms and 
model as a higher standard and expects others to imitate it. However, the unreflective 
nature of the EU’s NPE construction becomes apparent in that it did not adjust its 
normative objectives to a rather different setting in the Southern Mediterranean. 
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Moreover, the study of the Libyan case shows that the Union has not distanced itself 
from the policies of conditionality and differentiation, and applies them even in cases 
where the other party does not have a prospect of EU membership as an incentive for 
accepting its norms. Therefore, the Union’s self-construction as a NPE poses actual 
constraints to its foreign policy as it has to rely on the other party accepting the 
attractiveness of the EU model as it does not really have any strong positive incentives.  
Besides, the representation of Libya in terms of “humanitarian crisis”, which reflects the 
Union’s fear of immigration, raises the question whether the EU really wants to fulfil its 
role and be open to others. 
Analytical conclusions of the discourse on Libya as “another Yugoslavia” 
 
Secondly, the research focused on the opposing discourses within the European 
Union in order to demonstrate that there was an alternative construction of Libya and 
European identity. Moreover, the study of this discourse allowed analyzing the Union’s 
justifications for its non-participation in the military intervention, revealing other limits 
of the NPE constructions for the EU’s foreign policy. 
The study of the critical discourses unveils that there was actually one alterative 
discourse representing Libya as “another Yugoslavia”. Its strategy was using 
Yugoslavian analogue in order to pressure the Union to adopt a more interventionist 
approach in dealing with the conflict. The discourse constructed Gaddafi as radically 
different from Europe and the Libyans as “peaceful civilians”. However, as it was also 
to a large extent a securitizing discourse as it also represented Libya in terms of a 
“humanitarian catastrophe”, a “massacre” and a security threat in order to mobilize EU 
support. The discourse did contribute to the construction of NPE as it presented the 
Union in terms of a carrier of universal norms. However, it had an alternative 
understanding on how the EU should fulfil its role. It held a view that besides the 
assistance in post-crisis transformation, the European Union should be able to uphold its 
norms by military means. EU’s unwillingness to do so lead to the rise of a discourse 
constructing the Union as a weak and divided power, contrasting the Union’s tendency 
to assert normative goals with soft non-coercive instruments to the hard power of the 
U.S. and its own member states. 
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 The military action was justified by constructing Gaddafi as a threatening Other 
to the European Union and by emphasising on the legality and regional support for the 
action. It articulated that the EU had a moral duty to enforce the international law by 
stopping the mass killings is Libya and protecting its universal norms of democracy and 
human rights. The discourse on the need to end the massive human sufferings in Libya 
to trigger the responsibility for humanitarian intervention had much resemblance with 
the ones that surrounded the intervention on former Yugoslavia.  
The analysis of the Union’s response to the critical discourse reveals that it was 
based on the EU’s normative power identity constructions. The study shows that there 
were fears among the EU actors that the use of coercive measures would undermine the 
Union’s self-representation in terms of a “power of example” and “carrier of universal 
norms” as it would make Libyans reluctant to Europe’s norms export. However, when 
the conditions for military interventions were met, the EU rhetorically supported the 
action. The Union then had to justify why it was not participating in the imposition of a 
NFZ. The analysis of the EU’s counter-discourse demonstrated that the European Union 
uses its NPE identity as a justification for its non-interventionism and internal 
incoherence. The Union, drawing on its self-representation as a multilateral actor, 
argued that all actors in the international community and within the Union exert 
different roles in achieving a common goal. Moreover, the EU rejected any involvement 
in the military action by legitimizing its special role in providing aid and reconstruction, 
which was portrayed as vital and essential for real peace and security. 
In principle, the Union’s discursive practice was shifting the responsibility of 
military intervention to other allies and keeping the momentum towards conflict 
transformation. However, the failure to take part in military action reveals that the 
Union’s self-representation as a normative power sets constraints for its foreign policy 
capabilities as it rejects the use of military force and any other use of force. 
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Conclusion  
 
This thesis studied the discourses on the Libyan crisis within the European 
Union. The aim of this research was to demonstrate that the concept of normative power 
played a key role in shaping the EU foreign policy discourse in the context of Libyan 
conflict and find out which constraints this self-construction imposed on the Union’s 
foreign policy 
The study demonstrates that two discourses were present during the Libyan 
conflict which articulated different self/other construction and called for contrasting 
actions. The official discourse of the European Union constructed Libyan uprising in 
terms of “oriental version of the Eastern European revolution”. By presenting the 
Libyans as liberating themselves from the dictatorial Gaddafi regime, it argued for 
actions from the soft side of the spectrum. It constructed the EU’s normative power 
identity on the representation of the Union as a “power of example”, a “stabilizing 
force”, a “carrier of universal norms” and a “multilateral actor”. The study of the critical 
discourses indicated that there was one alternative discourse, which constructed Libya 
in terms of “another Yugoslavia” and called for military intervention in Libya. It was to 
a large extent a securitizing discourse which represented Libya as a potential security 
threat for the EU but at the same time articulated the EU’s responsibility to protect the 
Libyan people and duty to uphold its universal norms by the use of force.  
The analysis of the EU’s official discourse on Libya and its counter-arguments 
against the opposing discourse reveal that Diez was right in that normative power 
Europe is an identity construction practice of the European Union than a power as it is 
not backed up by any actual forms of power. It also reveals that the EU’s self-
construction as a NPE played a key role in shaping its foreign policy discourse during 
the Libyan conflict.  
First of all, the study reveals that the self-construction of the European Union as 
a normative power is expressed to a large extent as setting standards and leading by 
example, rather than using force in order to influence other actors. Europe’s NPE 
construction promotes a certain type of behaviour, such as non-interventionism and 
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multilateralism. However, these constructions set constraints to the EU’s ability to play 
enabling role in crisis management as it excludes military action and other use of force. 
Secondly, the Union’s aspirations to be the same “magnet” and “stabilizing 
force” for Libya as it was for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrate 
that the EU follows the same pattern in its foreign policy. A clear example of that was 
the EU’s policy of Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, which was 
designed as a measure aimed at transferring the Union’s norms, perceived as universal, 
through carrot-and-stick policies of conditionality. However, this self-understanding 
becomes constraining for the EU’s foreign policy as in the absence of a convincing 
“stick”, as was credible threat for the Libyans, the European Union has to rely on the 
other party accepting the attractiveness of the Union's model. The latter is not always 
available, especially given the lack of any strong positive incentives. 
It can be concluded that the construction of NPE imposes important constraints 
to the Union’s foreign policy which actually disempowers the EU’s political role as a 
global actor rather than empowers it. 
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Lühikokkuvõte  
 
Euroopa normatiivse võimu (de)konstrueerimine: Liibüa 
militaarinterventsiooni juhtumiuuring 
 
 
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärk on kriitiliselt uurida 2002. aastal Ian Mannersi 
poolt tutvustatud kontseptsiooni Euroopa Liidu normatiivsest võimust, millega ta üritas 
kaugeneda traditsioonilistest arusaamadest Euroopa Liidu rahvusvahelisest rollist. Suur 
osa senistest uuringutest on Euroopa normatiivse võimu mõistet kasutanud ilma piisava 
kriitikata, mistõttu ELi kujutatakse tihti idealiseerituna. Seega antud töö püüab 
kriitiliselt uurida Euroopa normatiivse võimu mõistet, käsitledes seda ELi identiteedina, 
mida konstrueeritakse oma sisemise „mina“ vastandamisel välisele. Antud uurimistöö 
analüüsib Euroopa normatiivse võimu konstrueerimist 2011. aasta Liibüa 
militaarinterventsiooni raames, mis oli ELi viimane suur katse näidata end olulise jõuna 
rahvusvahelisel areenil. Käesolev töö väidab, et Euroopa normatiivse jõu konstruktsioon 
mängis Liibüa kontekstis keskset rolli Eli välispoliitilise diskursuse kujundamisel. 
Uurimuse eesmärk on välja selgitada millist mõju see konstruktsioon tema 
välispoliitikale avaldab. Antud eesmärgi saavutamiseks lähtutakse Lene Hanseni poolt 
väljatöötatud poststrukturalistlikust diskursusanalüüsist. Allikatena kasutatakse Euroopa 
Liidu institutsioonide ja välispoliitilise tasandi mõtestajate ametlikke seisukohti Liibüa 
juhtumi ajal. Kuna meedial on suur mõju ametlikule diskursusele, siis lisaks uuriti veel 
ka Euroopa suurimate meediaväljaannete arvamusartikleid.  
 Uurimistöö empiiriline osa avab Euroopa tasandil kaks peamist diskursust, mis 
kujutasid kahte erinevat konstruktsiooni Liibüa konfliktist ja Euroopa Liidust ning 
nõudsid väga erinevaid meetmeid konflikti lahendamiseks. Esimene, ELi ametlik 
diskursus kujutas Liibüa konflikti kui „1989. aasta Ida-Euroopa revolutsiooni idamaist 
versiooni“. Selle diskursuse analüüs näitas, et Euroopa Liit konstrueeris end 
stabiliseeriva jõu, eeskuju seadja, universaalsete normide ja väärtuste edasikandja ning 
multilateraalse tegutsejana, mis propageeris „pehmeid“ vahendeid konflikti 
lahendamisel. Kriitilise diskursuse analüüs näitas ainult ühe alternatiivse diskursuse 
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olemasolu, mis kujutas Liibüa konflikti „teise Jugoslaaviana“. Seda lähenemist 
propageerisid ennekõike Prantsusmaa ja Suurbritannia, kuid ka suur osa meediast ning 
teatud osa ametnikest ELi enda institutsioonidest. Antud diskursus kasutas Liibüa puhul 
Jugoslaavia analoogi, et õhutada Euroopa Liitu kasutama oma normide kaitsmisel 
militaarseid vahendeid. Kuna Euroopa Liit nende üleskutsega kaasa ei läinud, siis antud 
uurimus pööras ka olulist rõhku ELi vastuargumentidele, et näha kas ja millisel määral 
Europpa Liidu normatiivse võimu identiteet mängis rolli tema otsuses mitte osaleda 
militaarinterventsioonis.  
 Tulemused näitavad, et Euroopa normatiivne jõud on tõepoolest pigem Euroopa 
Liidu enda poolt kujundatud identiteet, milles ta oma välispoliitilises tegevuses lähtub, 
ent mitte reaalne jõud. Niisamuti saab tõestust väide, et see konstruktsioon seab 
Euroopa Liidu välispoliitikale pigem piiranguid kui aitab tal mängida edukat rolli 
konfliktide lahendamisel. Euroopa normatiivse jõu kontruktsiooniga EList kui eeskuju 
seadjast, kujundatakse arusaama, et Euroopa mudel on niivõrd atraktiivne, et teised 
tahavad vabatahtlikult seda mudelit järgida ning tema norme üle võtta. Samas Euroopa 
Liidu väljapakutud meetmed oma mudeli levitamiseks Liibüas ei erinenud seniolevatest 
instrumentidest, kuna ta endiselt loodab enda mõju avaldada partnerluse ning 
konditsionaalsuse kaudu. Selline lähenemine seab Euroopa välispoliitikale piiranguid, 
kuna ilma väga mõjuva stiimulita, nagu seda oli ELi liikmelisus ida-Euroopa riikide 
puhul ning uuritud juhtumi kontekstis tõsine oht Gaddafi kujul, Euroopa Liit peab 
lootma sellele, et teine osapool vabatahtlikult aktsepteerib tema mudelit ning tahab tema 
sarnaseks saada. Teiseks, käesolev uurimus näitas, et Euroopa Liit kasutas oma 
normatiivse jõu konstruktsioone ka selleks, et õigustada enda mitteosalemist 
militaarinterventsioonis ning enda sisemisi poliitilisi vastuolusid. Seega teine 
normatiivse jõu konstruktsiooni piirav iseloom tuleneb sellest, et Euroopa normatiivse 
jõu identiteet põhimõtteliselt välistab igasuguse jõu kasutamise. Kokkuvõttes võib 
järeldada, et Euroopa Liidu enese kujundamine normatiivse võimuna pigem nõrgendab 
kui edendab tema poliitilist rolli maailmas. 
 
